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GO WORLD

Autumn 1999 NO. 86



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Kiseido Reprints of Two Important Go Classics

The 1971 Honinbo Tournament

by Iwamoto Kaoru

In November 1970, an unheralded 21-year-old 7-dan won his way into the Honinbo league. There, over the next 6 months, he beat some of the strongest go players in the world to earn the right to challenge Rin Kaiho for the Honinbo title.

At that time, Rin was the undisputed king of the go world. He had convincingly stripped the great Sakata Eio of his Meijin and Honinbo titles, and he had rebuffed him in his challenges to get them back. Rin was being billed as Go Seigen's successor and no one gave Ishida Yoshio much of a chance.

But Ishida was one of a new breed of players from that hot-house of go prodigies known as the Kitani Dojo. He was almost invincible and rarely lost a game — he had run up a string of 30 straight victories in the ranking tournament; he was a calm player, especially under pressure; he possessed superb positional judgment; and his endgame calculation was so accurate that he earned

the nickname 'the computer'. Rin was also noted for these same abilities, but Ishida was a level higher.

The 1971 Honinbo Tournament chronicles Ishida's first major triumph. It starts with his win in the final preliminary tournament which earned him the right to play in the Honinbo league. It then analyzes all seven of his games in the league, and the six games in the title match. Every game is analyzed in great detail, with easy-to-follow figures for each game.

The book was written by James Davies, based on the commentaries of Iwamoto Kaoru 9-dan who had held the Honinbo title for two terms from 1945 to 1950. Out of print for more than 20 years, it will be a welcome addition to the libraries of those players who are looking for in-depth game commentaries.

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The Cover: 'Actors at Play'. An oban triptych by Ginko. Published by Gusokuya in 1875. The title of the print is *Haiyu Zashiki Asobu no Zu* ('A Picture of Pastimes in the Actors' Sitting Room'). In the center foreground we see Ichikawa Danjuro IX playing go with Bando Hikosaburo V. At the left two more actors are playing shogi. Others amuse themselves with neckwrestling contests.

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Note: Japanese, Chinese, and Korean names are given with the family name first. The Pinyin romanization system is used for mainland Chinese names.

Go World News



Cho Sonjin, the new Honinbo, gets up to leave the playing room, while the dejected former Honinbo, Cho Chikun, remains behind.

Japanese Tournaments

Cho Sonjin captures the Honinbo title

The biggest upset of the year was the defeat of Cho Chikun in the Honinbo title match. Before the match the feeling was that Cho Sonjin, the challenger, would be lucky to win even one game against the champion, who has held the Honinbo title for the last ten years. But, as it turned out, the match didn't even go the full distance and the great Cho Chikun went down to defeat in the sixth game with four losses.

Cho Chikun had an easy win in the sixth game, but he missed a simple move that would have allowed him to win a capturing race. Instead, he played a move on the first line which he must have thought was a tesuji, but apparently he hallucinated. When his opponent answered on the first line, Cho found that he had lost a liberty and, since the game was now hopeless, he had to resign.

Although this loss must have been a great disappointment to him, Cho Chikun has vowed to be back next year as the challenger and to equal and surpass his record of ten consecutive Honinbo titles.

Yoda becomes the Meijin title challenger

This year's Meijin league was a hotly contested affair with three players, Yoda Norimoto, Kobayashi Koichi, and Ryu Shikun, ending up with identical 6-2 records. Ryu, who was leading the tournament with only one loss, seemed to be the favorite to become the challenger, but in the final round he lost to O Rissei by $\frac{1}{2}$ point. Unfortunately for him, since he was ranked below Yoda and Kobayashi, he was denied a place in the play-off where Yoda beat Kobayashi by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

With Cho Chikun's loss to the relatively unknown Cho Sonjin in the Honinbo title match, there is the feeling that Cho is vulnerable after all these years at the top, so Yoda must be looking forward to this second match with Cho.

However, Cho can't be underestimated. In the first game, played on September 1 and 2, Cho, playing white, beat Yoda by $1\frac{1}{2}$ points. The second game is scheduled for September 15 and 16.

Cho becomes the Oza title challenger

With his loss of the Honinbo title, Cho Chikun seems to be taking the 'minor' big

The 24th Meijin league

Rank		OR	KM	YN	KK	RS	TM	KS	MT	SM	Won	Lost
1	O Rissei		●	●	●	○	○	○	○	○	5	3
2	Kato Masao	○		●	●	●	○	●	○	○	4	4
3	Yoda Norimoto	○	○		●	○	●	○	○	○	6	2
4	Kobayashi Koichi	○	○	○		●	○	○	○	●	6	2
5	Ryu Shikun.	●	○	●	○		○	○	○	○	6	2
6	Takemiya Masaki	●	●	○	●	●		○	●	○	3	5
7	Kobayashi Satoru	●	○	●	●	●	●		○	○	3	5
7	Mimura Tomoyasu	●	●	●	●	●	○	●		○	2	6
7	Sakai Maki	●	●	●	○	●	●	●	●		1	7

seven titles more seriously as shown by his becoming the challenger for the Oza title, held by O Rissei. In the deciding game, Cho defeated Kato Masao. Cho (black), got an advantage in the opening and held on to it until Kato resigned after 147 moves. Cho last won the Oza title in 1994, but the following year O Rissei defeated him by a lopsided score of 3-0. Cho is probably out to avenge this loss. Last year, O unsuccessfully challenged Cho for the Honinbo and Meijin titles. Those two titles consisted of two-day games in best-of-seven matches. The question is will Cho, who excels in two-day games but often does not do well in one-day games, be able to play his best in a best-of-five match with one-day games. The first game of the best-of-five match will be played on October 25.

Kobayashi captures the Gosei title

Kobayashi Koichi has taken his third major title in less than a year, proving that at the age of 46 he is still a major to be contended with in the go world. After winning the Tengen title from Kudo last December, he went on to win the Judan title from Hikosaka on April 8, then on August 26 he defeated Yoda Norimoto 3-2 to take the Gosei title.

Kobayashi got off to a bad start in this best-of-five match by losing the first two games. It looked as if Yoda was going to have an easy time defending his title for the fourth year in a row, but Kobayashi buckled down and won the next three games.



Kobayashi looks quite satisfied with himself after winning his third title in less than a year.

The 12th Fujitsu Cup

Yoo Chang-hyuk vs. Ma Xiaochun

The semifinals of this year's Fujitsu Cup came down to two players from the Nihon Ki-in, Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Satoru, Ma Xiaochun from China, and Yoo Chang-hyuk representing Korea. Unfortunately for the Japanese side, both Cho and Kobayashi lost (Cho to Yoo and Kobayashi to Ma), thereby setting up another Korea-China final (last year Lee Chang-ho beat Chang-ho). Below is a brief commentary on this game.

White: Ma Xiaochun 9-dan

Black: Yoo Chang-hyuk 9-dan

Komi: 5 ½ points; time: 3 hours each.

Adapted from a commentary by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan.





Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). New moves by Ma

White 12 and 14 were new moves that Ma sprung on his opponent. They generated a lot of animated discussion among the observers in the pressroom.



Dia. 1

The usual joseki is shown in *Dia. 1*. Up to 11, the consensus is divided; Korean players feel that Black's thickness gives him a satisfactory result, while the Chinese contend that White should be happy with his position because he has been able to play on both sides with 1 and 11.


Black isolates the white stones on the left with 15 and 17.

Black 25 was the vital point. After this Black threatens to play Black 28-White A-Black B and White's stones are caught in a ladder. Therefore, White has no choice but to play 26.

Yoo thought for a long time about his next move. He wanted to cut through with the sequence Black 38-White C-Black D, but analyzing the ensuing fight would be difficult. In the end Yoo chose to force with 27, then attached with 29.

With the sequence to 37, Black has captured several stones on the left side, so White can no longer neglect to defend at 38 because Black 38 and D would put the white group at the bottom in great jeopardy.

In answer to the approach of 41, White 42 and 44 did not get a favorable reception from the players in the pressroom. With the sequence to 47, Black was able to capture the stones on the left side without leaving any bad aji behind. White should have simply answered Black 41 with 48.



Dia. 2

9: left of 5

Instead of White 46, cutting through with White 1 and 3 in Dia. 2 is unreasonable. Black would atari with 4 and squeeze with 6 and 8. White stones on the left side can live with 11 and 13, but Black would then invade the corner with 14.




Figure 2 (51-100)

Figure 2 (51-100). Fighting for the advantage

Black intends to get the advantage on the right side by attaching at 77. However, the result is unpredictable. If Lee Chang-ho were playing, he would simply block at the right of 74, then grind out a win in the end-game. He would next aim to invade the top somewhere around the star point.

White 88 was the vital point.

White 90 was also a good move, but when Black peeps at 101 in the Figure 3, the position becomes quite tense.




Figure 3 (101-128)

Figure 3 (101-128). Ma maps out a moyo

The sequence from Black 9 to 15 threatens to snatch away the territory at the bottom from White, but play then switches to other parts of the board; both sides leave the bottom unresolved. Finally, Ma maps out a huge territory at the top with White 20.




Figure 4 (129-151)

Figure 4 (129-151). Black takes the bottom.

With the sequence to 44, White lives on the left side. Black then plays a forcing move at 45, to expand his center. He next makes the long-awaited placement at 47, wiping out White's territory at the bottom.





Figure 5 (151-200)

Figure 5 (151-200). A cliff-hanger

According to Takemiya's estimate, Black was ahead on the board by seven or eight

points. But it wasn't so clear to Kobayashi Satoru. He thought that the losing move was White 88. Instead of this move, he suggested White 1 in *Dia. 3*. After White connects with 5, Black must defend at 6. Ma had to play the sequence in this diagram if he were to make up the half-point deficit.



Dia. 3

5: connects below 1

Figure 6 (201–244). Black wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

In the Fujitsu cup, there is also a playoff for third place, with the winner of that game receiving ¥4,000,000 for his efforts. Although it




Figure 6 (201–244)

is small compared to the ¥20,000,000 the winner receives and the ¥7,000,000 the runner-up gets, it is not a paltry sum and is certainly worth fighting for. Not only is the money a factor, but the winner of this games gets seeded in next year's tournament. The playoff featured Cho Chikun and Kobayashi Satoru. Up to move 125, Cho had a won game, but he then hallucinated and made a blunder in a capturing race, so he had to resign.

The 3rd LG Cup

Lee Chang-ho vs. Ma Xiaochun

The LG Cup was the second time this year that Lee and Ma faced each other in an international best-of-five match. In February, Lee defeated Ma 3–2 in the 3rd Samsung Cup. In this match, Lee completely dominated Ma, winning the match 3–0.

Game Three

White: Ma Xiaochun 9-dan


Black: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan

Komi: 5 $\frac{1}{2}$ points; time: 3 hours each


Played on May 10, 1999.

Figure 1 (1–48). The 'stone Buddha'

The joseki to White 10 is often played between Chinese and Korean players. Black



11 and 13 is the main variation. Up to 22, White has played on both sides while Black is thick in the center. The Chinese feel that White's position is superior, while the Koreans contend that Black has the better game.



Dia. 1

Ma regarded White 28 as a forcing move, so he nimbly switched to the upper right with 30 and 32. However, Lee suggested that it would have been better for White to first play the sequence to 9 in *Dia. 1*. He could then defend against the cut with 11 and next aim to play 30 and 32 in the figure. By playing as in this diagram, the placement of Black 33 in the figure would not be possible.

White 42 was a good move. White cannot omit it because Black will play the sequence Black 46–White A–Black B–White C–Black D, and the white stones are dead. On the other hand, if White plays 42 at 46, he will end in gote.

Black 43 was a mistake. White instantly played 44. Black should have ended the skirmish at the bottom in sente, but now he had to defend with 47 and White was able to take the initiative in the upper left with 48. In spite of this mistake, Lee continued to play on without showing the slightest sign of any emotion. Such a demeanor has earned him the nickname 'the stone Buddha'. Cho Hoon-hyun, who was giving the live Korean TV commentary said that Black should have played 43 at 45; he suggested the sequence White E–Black 43–White F–Black G–White D–Black H.

After White 48 was played, the players took a break for lunch.





Figure 2 (49–71)
64: at 57

Figure 2 (49–71). Ma's turn to blunder


For a brief moment, Ma had taken the lead, but then he too made a mistake when he answered Black 49 with White 50. As he usually does when his opponent slips, Lee pounced.



Dia. 2

Instead of 50, White 1 in *Dia. 2* is the strongest response in this kind of position. With the sequence to 9, White has stable positions on the left and at the top. Black ends in gote because he has to fix up his shape with A.

With the sequence to Black 55, White is in trouble.



Dia. 3

Instead of 52, if White ataris from the outside with 1 in *Dia. 3*, the sequence to 7 is inevitable. After this, the attachment at Black 8 is the tesuji. Up to 12, Black gets a sabaki shape. Black could also play 12 at 'a'; if White 'b', Black cuts at 'c', and White's corner collapses.

White 56 was another serious mistake; it was probably the losing move. It should have been played at A. The sequence to the connection of White 64 was inevitable.

When Black bumps against the white stone with 65, Black is limited in his responses: he has to submit with 68 and 70. Lee extends to Black 71; he is now in complete control.





Figure 3 (72-105)

Figure 3 (72-105). A hopeless game for Ma

White cannot omit 72. If he does, Black will build a vast moyo in the lower right by playing the sequence to 11 in *Dia. 4*.

Black attacked on the left side with the sequence from 73 on. The game was now hopeless for Ma.



Dia. 4

When Black played 105, he succeeded in mapping out a vast moyo in the center.




Figure 4 (106-159)

Figure 4 (106-159). A 15-point lead

White jumps out to 6 to try to reduce Black's moyo, but it is hopeless. Black is about 15 points ahead, not counting the komi.

White resigns after Black 159.

This game marked the fourth consecutive international championship that Lee had won in less than a year. His run began with his win in the Tong Yang Securities Cup on May 13, 1998. He then beat Chang Hao to take the Fujitsu Cup in August, then he beat Ma in the Samsung Cup final in February.

Lee seems, however, to have gone into a bit of a slump. In April he lost to Kato Masao in the Fujitsu Cup, eliminating him from that championship. He did manage to make it to the finals of the new Chinese-sponsored Chulan (Spring Orchid) Cup, where he faced his teacher Cho Hoon-hyun in a best-of-three match. The games were played on June 25, 27, and 29. Lee won only the second game.

The Chunlan Cup was Cho's fifth international triumph. His four other championships were the first Ing Cup, the 1994 Fujitsu Cup, and the Tong Yang Securities Cup in 1994 and 1997.

The preliminaries of the Samsung and LG cups are now under way, so the go world will be watching to see if Lee can repeat his triumphs in these two championships again.

Asia TV Cup Final

Yoda Noriomoto vs. Lee Chang-ho

The TV Asia Cup is an international tournament broadcast in China, Japan, and Korea. It is open to the finalists in Japan's NHK Cup, China's CCTV Cup, and Korea's KBS Cup, with an extra place reserved for the previous year's winner. Since Yoda Norimoto won the cup last year and also won the NHK cup this year, the open place was given to Takemiya Masaki who won the title for its first four terms and who was also a semifinalist in this year's NHK Cup.

The three favorites were Lee Chang-ho, Yoda, and Chang Hao. In the semifinals Lee beat Takemiya and Yoda beat Chang, setting up a showdown between Lee and Yoda. Lee, who is considered by many to be the strongest player in the world, has fared badly against Yoda. In their eight encounters up to this tournament, Yoda won six games and lost only two. Most of Yoda's wins, however, came early in Lee's career. In the last year they have played two games and won one each. Clearly, they are evenly matched. Their game below was closely fought, but in the end it was Yoda who eked out a $2\frac{1}{2}$ -point win and raised his win-loss record against Lee to 7-2.

White: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Komi: $5\frac{1}{2}$ points; **time:** 30 seconds a move.

Commentary by O Meien 9-dan




Figure 1 (1-39)

Figure 1 (1-39). A questionable probe

Black played 31 as a probe. After White 32, Black aims at the attachment of A. However, it is unclear if Black has gained anything out of the exchange up to 38. White's corner is thick. All Black is left with is a sente move at B.






Figure 2 (40-67)

Figure 2 (40-67). How long to keep jumping?

If White didn't have the stone to the left of 48 (White 30 in Figure 1) already in place, he would never have attached at 40. As you can see in *Dia. 1*, after the exchange of White 1 for 2, Black is starting to get strong on the left side and a white invasion would become difficult.




Dia. 1




Dia. 2

However, with White 30 in place, White must make this exchange before jumping to 42. If White omits it and simply jumps to 42 or attacks the black stone with 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black will invade the corner with 2 and live with the sequence to 8. White's position, although thick, is overconcentrated. Therefore, defending the corner first is the best strategy.

With the sequence to 46, White is building up strength facing down the left side. He is looking for a chance to cut through with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*. White can defend his position on the left side with 4 and 6, but later in the game, White might not answer the peep at 4 with 5, so Black plays this move with 47 when White has no choice but to answer.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Instead of making a checking extension with 49, Black could have jumped out to 55. If Black had played this way, White might want to extend to 1 in *Dia. 4* to prevent Black A, but then Black would cap at 2 and the white stones on the left would be in trouble.




Dia. 5

Of course, there is a limit to how long both sides can keep jumping. After the exchange of 3 for White 4 in *Dia. 5*, Black gets a large moyo at the top with 5. But White might not jump to 4; he could extend to A instead because now the cap of Black 4 would not be so severe. As it turned out, Black quickly made the checking extension at 49.




Dia. 6

Black 52 was the vital point. If White answers 51 with 1 in *Dia. 6*, White will force with 2 and 4. If White 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black takes the vital point with 2. If White defends with 3, Black strengthens his moyo at the top with 4.



Dia. 7

Black 61 was a good move. This is because White 58 aims at A. If Black defends with the marked stone, White can wipe out Black's moyo at the top with 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8*. With a black stone at A, Black can easily link up his stones on the left to his allies of the right, so White 1 and 3 are not so severe.



Dia. 8





Figure 3 (68-100)


Figure 3 (68-100). White invades.

Black answers White's invasion at 68 with 69. White loses points with this move because Black A becomes sente after Black 69. However, White is aiming at the center. Next, White cuts with 70, and, after Black 73, cuts through with 74 and 76.




Dia. 9

Black 79 is necessary. If Black ignores it, White plays the sequence to 5 in Dia. 9, then, when Black captures with 6, turns at 7. White's stones at the bottom have escaped.




Dia. 10

It is tempting for White play 84 at 1 in Dia. 10. However, Black cuts at 2 and, after the sequence to 14, the five white stones at the bottom are trapped.



Dia. 11

In answer to Black 95, White must atari underneath at 96. If he answers with 2 in Dia. 11, Black will capture the white stones in a loose ladder, as the sequence to Black 21 shows.



Dia. 12

Black secures his stones on the right with 97. Black 1 in Dia. 12 looks like a tesuji, but when Black connects with 5, White attaches with 6 and the black stones are caught short of liberties. With the sequence to White 8, all of Black's stones on the left side die.





Figure 4 (100-151)

Figure 4 (100-151). An overplay by Lee

After Black secures his stones on the left side with the sequence to 5, White captures with 6, getting a thick position in the center.

Black ignores White 8 and attacks the white stones on the right with 9. White can't afford to answer passively, for example, by blocking at 13, so he bulges out into the center with 10, then presses with 12, aiming to make territory in the center.




Dia. 13


White 18 is a clever forcing move. If Black greedily tries to capture this stone with 2 in Dia. 13, his position at the bottom will collapse, as the sequence to White 13 shows.

White 20 is an overplay. This stone is cut off with the sequence to 35.

Black cannot play 28 at 2 in Dia. 14. Black will atari with 3 and captures the white stones in a loose ladder as the sequence to Black 27 shows.




Dia. 14



Dia. 15

In answer to 38, Black can cut at 2 in Dia. 15. Black cuts off the white stones at the top with 8 and White must defend with 9. But when Black jumps to 10, White can't capture the black stones because when Black plays 14, the marked black stone is perfectly placed.



Dia. 16

In answer to White 42, Black could have played 2 in Dia. 16. If White tries to defend the center with the sequence to 7, Black will play 8 and the white stones at the bottom will die.





Figure 5 (152-200)



Dia. 17

Figure 5 (152-200). *Need for caution*

Black must be careful how he answers White 52. If he blocks at 2 in *Dia. 17*, White will play 3. If Black defends with 4, White plays 5 and 7. If Black A, White B; if Black captures at C, White A captures six black stones.




Figure 6 (201-243)

Figure 6 (201-243). *A close game*

The game was close to the end. Both sides made mistakes in the endgame, but when the game was counted, it was Yoda who won by 2 ½ points win.

Black wins by 2 ½ points.

(Adapted from a TV commentary by O Meien.)

The 1st Chulan Cup

Yoda Norimoto vs. Lee Chang-ho

Our readers may be interested in seeing the game that Yoda and Lee played in the semifinals of the Chulan Cup in April. In this game, it was Lee who won by the barest margin: half a point.

White: Lee Chang-ho 9-dan

Black: Yoda Norimoto 9-dan

Komi: 5 ½ points; time: 3 hours each

Played on April 23, 1999.

Figure 1 (1-50). *The same opening*

The first 23 moves here are identical to the game Yoda and Lee played in the TV Asia Cup presented above. In this game, however, Lee defended the corner by jumping down to 24 instead of attaching at 31.

When White attached with 12, Yoda might have played a moyo strategy by blocking on the outside with Black 1 in *Dia. 1*. After White defends the corner with 8, Black jumps to 9. However, the possibility of White A leaves Black with bad aji.






Figure 1 (1-50)




Dia. 1

Instead of jumping to 35, if Black makes the checking extension with the marked stone, he can aim to attach with 1 and reduce White's corner with the sequence to 10 in Dia. 2.



Dia. 2

However, White would answer Black 1 in Dia. 3 with the forcing moves of 2 and 4, then take the last big extension with 6. The game would be quite satisfactory for White.



Dia. 3





Figure 2 (51-100)


Figure 2 (51-100). Missed opportunities

Black 53 was the last big extension of the opening. This was certainly an excellent move, but Black could have taken the initiative by forcing with 1 and 3 in Dia. 4, then attacking the two white stones in the center with 5.



Dia. 4

After Black defended at 75, White could have gotten a clear advantage by playing the sequence to 5 in *Dia. 5*.



Dia. 5





Figure 3 (101-151)

Figure 3 (101-151). Yoda slips in the endgame.


In answer to Black 7, White must not connect at 1 in *Dia. 6* because Black will cut at 2. If White saves his two stones at the top, Black can force with A and B, then take the center with C.



Dia. 6


Black 13 was a good move. The sequence to White 22 was a success for him. If White resists

with 1 in *Dia. 7*, Black will play the sequence to 6. If White connects at A, Black will cut at B and all of White's stones at the top will be captured.



Dia. 7

Unfortunately, Black made many slips in the endgame after this. For example, he should have played at 1 in *Dia. 8* instead of 37 in the figure. White must block at A, but then Black B is sente. Therefore, Black would gain the two points marked X in the corner and C. When White played 38, he gained the two points marked X as well as the two points marked A and B. Next, White C is sente and Black must defend the corner. This means that Black 1 in this diagram is worth seven points. White must defend at A after Black 1, so Black can now play D.



Dia. 8





Figure 4 (152-200)

Figure 4 (152–200). *More slips by Yoda*

Black 75 was another mistake. If Black plays 1 in *Dia. 9*, White must answer at 2, then Black can play 3 and 5. If White responds with 2 in *Dia. 10*, the aji of a ko remains in the corner.



Black 93, allowing White to capture with 94, was also a mistake. White 94 alone was worth five points, but the two moves of Black 95 and 99 were worth 6 points.




Figure 5 (201–256)

Figure 5 (201–256).

White wins by $\frac{1}{2}$ point.

The 1st Chinese Kisei Title Match

Chang Hao vs. Ma Xiaochun

This newly inaugurated title is clearly meant to be the most prestigious of the Chinese titles. Just as in the Japanese Kisei tournament, all Chinese pros from 1-dan to 9-dan are eligible to compete, and the final is a best-of-seven match. The final of the Chinese Kisei title match came down to China's number one (Chang Hao) and number two (Ma Xiaochun) players. Chang won the match 4–3. Here is the final game.

Game Seven

White: Ma Xiaochun 9-dan

Black: Chang Hao 8-dan

Play on June 11, 1999

Figure 1 (1–50)

Recently Chang has been playing the low Chinese opening whenever he has Black.

Attaching at Black 19 was a good move. Exchanging Black A for White B would be crude. If Black next jumped to 25, White would play 29 and Black has no good response.





Figure 1 (1–50)

Even though White 26 and 30 help Black secure territory, they are not without merit. After the sequence to White 38, the black stone at 23 has nowhere to go. Instead of 34, if White extended to 1 in *Dia. 1*, White's prospects are not too bright after the sequence to Black 6.



Dia. 1

Ignoring White 44 and switching to the left side with Black 45 is strong. If Black plays out the skirmish in the upper right corner, he will most likely end in gote.




Figure 2 (51-100)
83: at 63; 86: at 66

Figure 2 (51-100)

White thought for a long time before blocking at 58. White really couldn't afford to descend to 59. Black is strong on the outside, so he could make life on the lower left side without his stones on the outside being too seriously affected. The balance of territories would then shift in Black's favor.

With White 60, Ma maps out a large moyo on the left side. Even though Ma usually prefers secure territory, the game is certainly not unfavorable for him.

Figure 3 (101-151)

Instead of White 10, the proper move would have been at 43.





Figure 3 (101-151)
25: at the marked stone; 49: at 7

The timing of Black 11 was excellent. If White answers this move with 1 in *Dia. 2*, Black will play 2 and 4. After White connects at 5, Black 6 threatens to link up to his two stone above in sente.



Dia. 2

Black 13 was a big mistake. Chang didn't see White's move at 20. Now Black had to fall back to 21 and White was able to defend the cut with 26. This was a big loss for Black.

Figure 4 (151-200)

White 82 was the losing move. Playing the ordinary atari at 83 would have been the best endgame move. Perhaps Ma overlooked Black's extension at 87.




Figure 4 (151–200)

Figure 5 (201–288)

Black wins by 3 1/2 points.




Figure 5 (201–288)

31, 37, 43, 49, 55: at the black triangle stone; 34, 40, 46, 52: at 20; 42: at the black square stone; 74, 80, 86: at the white triangle stone; 77, 83, 88: at 71

The Kiseido website has moved to:

<http://www.yk.rim.or.jp/~kiseido/index.html>

The Kiseido website has been redesigned with many new features added.

- Kiseido customers can order go books and go equipment online through this site.
- Up-to-date results of the most recent Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and international tournaments.
- Links to the game records of the main Japanese title matches: Kisei, Meijin, and Honinbo. Game records of the main international tournament are planned.
- The rules of go for beginners.
- Advice on how to get stronger at go.
- Planned for early 2000: a go server, where players the world over can enjoy playing go over the internet. Watch our site for the announcement of the inauguration of this server.

The 23rd Kisei Title Match



Cho and Kobayashi analyzing the first game, watched by the game recorder, Hans Pietsch 2-dan.

Game One

This was the second time in little over a year that Kobayashi challenged Cho Chikun for one of his Triple Crown titles. In autumn of 1997, he challenged Cho for the Meijin title (see GW82), but lost 4–2. Kobayashi has obviously been playing well. He won the Tengen title in November and took the Judan title in April, but it seems that Cho is too strong for him, even when he is in his best form: he lost the match 4–2.

White: Kobayashi Koichi, Tengen

Black: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Played in Paris on January 13 & 14, 1999

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan





Figure 1 (1–30)

24: takes ko at 16; 27: takes ko at 21



Dia. 1

Figure 1 (1–30). An opening ko

Kobayashi began the match with a new pattern at White 18 and 20, but Cho came out ahead by making White connect at 28. White could have avoided this by using 26 to capture at 1 in *Dia. 1*, then repairing the lower left corner with 3 to 9. Black's top left group is alive, but 'a' is White's sente. White can also play 5 at 'b'.




Figure 2 (31-56)

42: connects (right of 38)

Figure 2 (31-56). *White invades.*

White 36 and 42 were too obedient. For 36, I'd prefer White 39-Black 38-White 37-Black 36-White 47-Black 49. White 42 doesn't make sense unless White plays 44 at 45, but then Black A eliminates White 44. Black 45 forced White 46, so Black also got to play 47. Badly needing to restore the territorial balance, White invaded with 54 and 56.





Figure 3 (57-81)

Figure 3 (57-81). *The price of the corner*

Black could not kill the white invaders, but he made White pay for the corner by playing 59. Besides strengthening Black outwardly, White's invasion made it impossible to play White 1 in Dia. 2. Black 2 and 4 would threaten 'a' and a large center.



Dia. 2

Figure 4 (82-103). *White invades again.*

Now White was in the uneasy position of having to invade at 82, after Black had defended with the marked stone. Black played ladder blocks at 95 and 97, preparing for Black 99, and settled the issue by capturing five white stones.




Figure 4 (82-103)

Figure 5 (104-203). *Black coasts to victory.*

Black saved three stones with 7 and 9, then did nothing more for the rest of the game. If he had played 31 on the point above 32, White would probably have resigned right there.

White resigns after Black 203.




Figure 5 (104-203)

Game Two

White: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Black: Kobayashi Koichi, Tengen

Played on January 27 & 28, 1999

Commentary by Otake Hideo 9-dan




Figure 1 (1-40)

Figure 1 (1-40). Playing for territory

Black 1-11 is a popular opening now, but the Kobayashi of old would have played 3 at 5 or A, then closed the bottom right corner with a small knight's move. He reverted to his territory-oriented style in the top right, giving White a ponnuki that Cho put to good use later. I think Black should have played 23 at 24.





Figure 2 (41-62)

Figure 2 (41-62). A sharp invasion

Black's position at the start of this figure, already doubtful because his bottom framework was still open to invasion at A, suddenly got worse when Cho played White 42.



Dia. 1

Rather than give White the large profit in Dia. 1, Black played to take the marked stone in return for the two black stones that White could have captured by playing 62 at B.

Figure 3 (63-104). A decisive crosscut

After saving two stones with 63 and 65, Black was reluctant to cut at A, because that would make White 74 sente. White had to be careful not to play 1 in Dia. 2, letting Black

drive through his position in sente (14 threatens 'a'). White 84 is worth remembering: it defends the corner better than B. After stealing Black's eye shape with angle attacks at 82 and 86, White made a decisive crosscut at 102 and 104.





Figure 3 (63-104)



Dia. 2

5: connects (to the right of 3)

Figure 4 (105-136). A life worse than death

Black wanted to play 1 to 11 in Dia. 3 and live by capturing the marked stone, but that doesn't work, thanks to the two marked stones in Dia. 4. White forced Black to live with two bare eyes, leaving A undefended, and also slipped in White 16. Black could not answer at B because White had too many ko threats. White 36 as good as ended the game.






Figure 4 (105-136)



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Figure 5 (137-208). Black resigns.

Kobayashi was unable to recover from bad starts in both of the first two games. He seemed to have trouble finding himself, while Cho, as always, played his own game to the hilt.

Black resigns after White 208.




Figure 5 (137-208)
108: makes two eyes (above and right of 54)

Game Three

White: Kobayashi Koichi, Tengen

Black: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Played on February 3 & 4, 1999

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan




Figure 1 (1-46)

Figure 1 (1-46). *Cho innovates.*

Cho tried a new move at Black 15. White resisted with 16, and seemed to gain a slight advantage in the difficult fighting that followed.

Figure 2 (47-76). *The attack begins.*

Black may have rushed to play 47 because he felt behind, but he should have patiently strengthened his center. White could have attacked immediately by playing 48 at A, instead of going through the elaborate preparations from 48 to 66. Cho commented that he should have played B instead of Black 61 and 63. White 76 started an all-out attack.




Figure 2 (47-76)

Figure 3 (77-114). *Complex fighting.*

Attack and defense continued. With several life-and-death struggles going on simultaneously, the situation was too complex to fathom completely, but, in my opinion, Black should have played 113 at A.




Figure 3 (77-114)




Figure 4 (115-186)

Figure 4 (115-186). *The center dies.*

The fighting seemed to be getting out of hand, but White finally routed his opponent by cutting with 28 and 30.

Black resigns after White 186.

Game Four

White: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Black: Kobayashi Koichi, Tengen

Played on February 17 & 18, 1999

Commentary by Kobayashi Satoru 9-dan




Figure 1 (1-23)

Figure 1 (1-23). *At the saint's birthplace*

This game was played on the island of In-no-shima, birthplace of the go saint (kisei)

Shusaku. Black 21 is the modern move. Black A, often seen until recently, is now considered too generous, as it lets White play 21. It would not do to invade two corners at the 3-3 point, so Black played 23 instead of B.




Figure 2 (24-46)

Figure 2 (24-46). *Black tries a new move.*

Normally, Black plays 31 at 35, allowing White A. Black 31 raised some eyebrows, but the resulting position isn't very different from the position with 29 at B, and if 29 were at B, no one would think of questioning 31. For White 44, the sensible move is White C, followed by Black D and White E, but Cho must have found that too tame.




Figure 3 (47-72)

54, 60: takes ko (right of 47); 57: at 51

Figure 3 (47–72). *A difficult ko*

Black could have played 61 at A, but White had a matching ko threat at B. Black also had C, but the ko is hard to figure out. Black could have played 63 at D, followed, by White E. If Black then plays 66, White plays F. If Black plays F, White plays G. Black could also have played 65 at 66, but I can't say whether any of this is an improvement on the actual game.




Figure 4 (73–100)

Figure 4 (73–100). *The wrong time for gote*

Black 75 was a bad move, because it helped White play 84 later. Black should have played 77 at 78, perhaps followed by White 77 and Black A, but Black's real mistake may have been to take gote at 97. White 98 threatened White B-Black C-White D. Black had to defend at 99. Next —





Figure 5 (101–134)

Figure 5 (101–134). *Black lives, White leads.*

White made a very big four-stone capture, taking a lead roughly equal to the komi. Black 17 gained a sure life, but perhaps Black should have played *Dia. 1*, aiming at the lettered sequence from Black 'a' to 'e'.



Dia. 1

Figure 6 (135–200). *Lax judgment*

Black 45 was severe, but too late. Earlier in the game, Black had been lax in his judgment of what he needed to do to win.




Figure 6 (135–200)

Figure 7 (201–285). *Cho takes a 3–1 lead.*

White 2 at 9, followed by White 10, is safer. At the end, Black has to add a move in the top right. Otherwise, when A is filled, White can play B.

White wins by 1 1/2 points.




Figure 7 (201-285)
66: at 11; 73: at 44

Game Five

White: Kobayashi Koichi, Tengen

Black: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Played on February 24 & 25, 1999

Commentary by Takemiya Masaki 9-dan





Figure 1 (1-34)

Figure 1 (1-34). Avoiding overcommitment

Black played 25, rather than a move like A, to avoid overcommitment to the right side, but White 26 to 34 left White with useful forcing moves at B and C. I would have preferred to play Black 33 at 34, allowing White D. Dia. 1 shows the continuation. Black 13 is the correct move in this sequence, rather than Black 14-White 'a'-Black 13-White 16-Black 'b'-White 'c'-White 'd'.



Dia 1

Figure 2 (35-53). Surprised by a doubtful move

White was glad to answer Black 37 by attaching and extending. Perhaps Black should have played 37 at 42, or played 37 before 35. Cho said he never imagined that White would play 52, the sealed move ending the first day. I also have my doubts about White 52. I expected White A or B.




Figure 2 (35-53)

Figure 3 (53-68). A 'cosmic' suggestion

After over two hours of thought, Cho played Black 53, but the value of this move was greatly diminished by White 56. I'd like to suggest Dia. 2, giving Black a center that White can't easily ignore but can't easily invade.





Figure 3 (53-68)



Dia. 2





Figure 4 (69-85)

Figure 4 (69-85). *Black in consternation*

White played 78 rather than risk White 80-Black 78-White 79-Black A. Next, White engulfed the black stone on the left side with 82. This must have upset Cho, making him play Black 85 instead of 1 in *Dia. 3*, which would have left the game still difficult.



Dia. 3

Figure 5 (86-102). *Black's corner dies.*

White 102 killed the black group (Black A-White B-Black C-White D). It's worth noting that if White had played 102 at A, Black would have won by giving atari next to 92, then blocking below 96.

Black resigns after White 102.




Figure 5 (86-102)

Game Six

White: Cho Chikun, Kisei

Black: Kobayashi Koichi, Tengen

Played on March 10&11, 1999

Commentary by Cho Chikun





Figure 1 (1-30)

Figure 1 (1-30). Attach and descend

I rarely play the pincer at White 6, but I was putting extra effort into this game. Kobayashi likes to attach and draw back, then make a pincer, usually at Black 1 in *Dia. 1*. After Black 9, White will not play 'a'-'b'-'c' or 'a'-'b'-'d', but simply wedge in at 'c', or close the corner at White 10, saving 'c' for later. Black 13 seems to be an improvement on Black 1 in *Dia. 1*.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2


White 18 was another extra-effort move, but it poses a problem. I played there to take away Black's eye space, but this diminished

the value of the four-stone snip at White A. I now think I should have played White 1 in *Dia. 2*, eliminating Black 'a'–White 1–Black 'b', and Black 'a'–White 1–Black 'c'. White should still not snip at 3, however, because after Black 12, White has to add another stone in the corner. Following White 1, White should play 3 in *Dia. 3*, or possibly play 3 immediately, without playing 1. The trouble with White 1 is that it gives Black an eye anytime at 'a'.



Dia. 3

I expected Black 21 and 23, but not 25 and 27. This tight way of playing is very much in Kobayashi's style. Who else would think of attaching and descending here? Apparently this maneuver got a bad reception, both on-site in Sapporo and in Tokyo, but if you think about it, it was really quite clever.



Dia. 4

The ordinary idea is to head for the center with Black 1 in *Dia. 4*, starting a running fight that tests the relative strengths of the various weak groups. Black can't peep at 'a', 'b', or 'c', because that would immediately weaken the black group at the top. That means White is stronger than Black, which is why this plan was rejected.





Figure 2 (31-62)

Figure 2 (31-62). Black gets the lead.


Kobayashi regretted cutting at Black 31. He said he should have taken a lighter view of his stones in the bottom left and played Black 1 in *Dia. 5*, fighting against the group above. Black 1 takes advantage of the marked stone and eliminates White 'a'. White seems to have no good refutation.



Dia. 5


I reinforced my group with White 32 to 36, putting more pressure on the black group

above, and sealed White 38, a large cut, to end the first day.




Dia. 6

No sooner was the envelope opened the next morning than Black gave atari at 39. I was completely taken aback by this obviously bad move. I had been expecting Black 1 in *Dia. 6*, which is probably locally correct. I had been trying to decide whether to answer at White 2, or press in at White 'a'. White 2 may be better than 'a', to keep a safe distance from the strong position that Black can build with 3, 5, 7, and 9. When Black played 'b' instead of 1, I should still have played White 2, but I began to worry that Black might capture at 'c', even though that would be very dangerous for Black because of White 'd'–Black 'e'–White 'f'. The result was that Black 39 misled me into descending at White 40, giving Black the ideal point at 41. This was the prime point on the board, and when Black got it, he took the lead.



Dia. 7

After the joseki in the bottom right, Black tried to make a forcing move at 51. This was unnecessary. He could have kept a firm grip on the lead with Black 1 in *Dia. 7*. If White plays 2 and 4, Black plays 5, his framework expanding with every move.



White was desperate to invade, but White 61 may have been a better invasion point than White 52. If Black answered 52 at A, I was planning to play B, which would reduce Black's framework while taking aim at the black stones in the upper left. After playing out the sequence through White 60, however, Black made a good shoulder hit at 61. All I could do was invade on the 3-3 point with White 62. White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 8* would just deepen Black's valley, giving him sente moves at 'a' and 'b'. As for the ko in *Dia. 9*, White has no immediate ko threats, and even if White wins the ko and captures at 'a', Black 'b' is still a good move.





Figure 3 (62-84)

Figure 3 (62-84). The brink of survival

When Black drew out his stone at 75, everyone following the game must have known who was ahead. White's only chance to catch up lay in moving out at 76. By wriggling for all he was worth, White might be able to trim

Black's framework down to size and perhaps even attack the black group to the left. If White were to play 76 at 77, he would be purely on the defensive, a sure road to defeat (Black plays 76). White needed to go beyond trimming; he needed to show the gleam of an attack.



Dia. 10

Black 77 was a firm reply. A stronger reply was available at Black 1 in *Dia. 10*, the variation shown being favorable to Black. White can play 4 at 8, however, and Kobayashi must have abandoned this line because of his unstable group to the left.

If White plays 78 at 80, Black can form a large framework with Black 84-White 78-Black A. White's actual moves kept him in contention, but White was playing on the brink of survival.





Figure 4 (85-110)

Figure 4 (85–110). A turning point

White 88 invited Black 89. Playing White 88 at 89 would have had no effect on Black. The atari at Black 99 was one of the turning points in the game. If Black had kept up the chase with 1 in *Dia. 11*, White would have been in as much trouble as ever, but Kobayashi had apparently misread White's placement at 2, not realizing that he could answer White 6 at Black 7. *Dia. 11* leaves White without eyes, so White will play 2 to 6 in *Dia. 12*, but he is still in a fix.



When I was able to jump to White 102, the word 'survival' departed from my mind. Now that I was in a more comfortable position, the idea of an attack on the black group above began to take shape. In fact, I still needed to be careful.





Figure 5 (111–146)


Figure 5 (111–146). White reaches safety.

By this time I was in minute-a-move overtime. Giving no thought to my own safety, I extended at White 18 to attack the black group above. That was rash. In the face of Black's leaning maneuver at 21, my position was unexpectedly precarious. Once again I had to fight for survival.



Dia. 13


The wisest move was just to jump to White 1 in *Dia. 13*. White had to leave himself the get-away sequence from 'a' to 'e', or the life-giving hane at 'f'. It was still a little too early to think about counterattacking. Fortunately, White could still move toward the bottom at 24. If Black blocked White's path at 28, White would play 27, getting one eye in sente, then easily make a second eye around White 20.



Dia. 14


Black 29 was an overplay. Black should just have played A, but I matched Black with White 34, a mistake that makes one want to cover one's eyes. All White needed to do was connect at 1 in *Dia. 14*. If Black plays 2, White strikes across at 3 and is home safely. Black 'a' is answered by White 'b'.

Black 37 was a strong move, but somehow, White was still managing to survive. The last difficult problem arose at Black 43. That move let White reach safety easily, as we shall see in the next figure. What if Black had peeped at 1 in *Dia. 15*, then played 3? This is an important question. White can connect at 2, or give atari at 'a'. If White connects at 2, he can link up on the first line with White 4 to 18. If Black plays 5 at 8, then after White 7-Black 5-White 6, White links up in sente, because White 2 fills one of Black's liberties.



Dia. 15

If Black had peeped at Black 1, however, I would quite probably have given atari at 1 in *Dia. 16*. Now White 'a' doesn't work, because Black plays 'b' and the liberty at 'c' is still open. What if White plays 4, then? The ko starting from White 'd' should be easy to see. Keeping an eye on that ko, White will go on a rampage at 10 and 12. Black's center is weak, and since White has the ko, I expect that he can manage somehow, but I don't know what will happen next. At a minimum, Black should have gambled on this variation. The moves actually played made White's life easy.



Dia. 16





Figure 6 (146-200)


Figure 6 (146-200). *No more chances*

Since Black played 47 after White 46, White was able to reply with 48 and 50. If Black plays 49 at 1 in *Dia. 17*, White, luckily, has a perfect reply in the peep at 4. If Black plays 'a', White plays 'b'; if Black 'c', White 'a'; if Black 'd', White 'c'. Now White was able to save his group by setting up a connection to the left, leaving White 60 and so on for later. If Black plays 59 at 1 in *Dia. 18*, the connection to the left is broken, but before linking up, White will rampage a bit with 2 and 8. Once the group White is saving grows this big, the black stones in the center are weak.





Even though he lost the match, Kobayashi (right) still finds something to laugh about in the game.



Dia. 19

After getting sente to play White 64 to 68, I began to feel a little ahead. The lower edge was still unsettled, but suppose that at Black 73, Black plays 1 and so on in *Dia. 19*. White 12 is sente, so White is linked up on the first line. Black 13 starts a ko in the corner, but White can fight it and Black doesn't have a chance. White 'a', capturing three stones, is big in itself, and Black's center has little hope of surviving.

Black 89 at A puts the entire white group into ko, but White cuts at B, then jumps in to C, and once again Black doesn't seem to have a chance.




Figure 7 (201-272)

11: above 5; 58: above 36; 72 left of 70

Figure 7 (201-272). Another lucky win


The final result was a tie on the board. I was surprised to be so far ahead. Once again, I had been lucky; *Dia. 12* or *16* might have changed everything. Winning this game and defending the title was luck and nothing more.

White wins by 5 1/2 points.

(Adapted from *Kido*, March, April, and May 1999. Translated by James Davies.)

Michael Redmond on the Opening

I have devoted two articles to the low Chinese opening in GW83 and GW 85. In this issue I will analyze the mini-Chinese opening which has appeared quite frequently in recent professional games.




Dia. 1


The pattern of Black 3, 5, and 7 in *Dia. 1* is the mini-Chinese opening. This is an old pattern and was first played by Honinbo Dosaku (1645–1702); he would often use it as white in two-stone handicap games. However, there is a difference between the way Dosaku played this pattern and the way it is played today. If Black broke up the right side with 8, Dosaku's method would be to make a checking extension to Black A. When White answered by extending to B, Black would build territory by making a corner enclosure with C. From the modern point of view, this is a bit slack: the initiative passes to White because, even though Black has made a corner enclosure, White can invade at D or E. The modern style is to make territory by fighting.

Dia. 2 shows one of the first josekis using the modern approach. Black makes a checking extension all the way to 1, forcing White to extend down the side with 2. The shoulder hit of Black 3 now has a good feel to it. Black 7 aims at 'a', so White defends with 8. Black then plays 9 — this move was more effective in securing the territory at the bottom than 'b'. However, there are some problems with this strategy. If White invades at 'c', 'd', or 'e', will Black be able to kill the invading stones? With

exact play, White would be unable to live, but still, Black must be careful because he has bad aji around here.



Dia. 2




Dia. 3

The game in *Dia. 3* was played a while after the one in *Dia. 2*. Black makes a tighter checking extension to 1. Unlike the extension in *Dia. 2*, where there is an invasion point at 'f', there is no easy way for White to invade in the upper right. However, in this position, even if Black plays 7 at 'a', Black 1 is too far away for Black 'b' to be an effective move. However, Black 7 works well with respect to the bottom and, depending how things develop later, Black 'b' is still an option. The shoulder hit of White 'c' is still left behind, but in compensation Black is more secure in the upper right. For these reasons, there is nothing wrong with Black's position.


Sliding to White 4 in *Dia. 4* is a counterstrategy against Black 3. The sequence to White 12 is the one most often seen in professional games. After this, Black will switch to another part of the board. In this exchange, there are a number of things that must be considered. Can Black block at 6 instead playing 5? Or can Black play 5 or 7 at 'a'?

Black can't play 11 at 'b' because White will cut at 'c'. Moreover, Black 'd' against White 12 is overly ambitious. Unlike *Dia. 3*, White's stones on the right are secure, but Black can't expect to get much territory at the bottom because of the shoulder hit of White 'e'. He can get more by playing elsewhere!




Dia. 4

White also has some things to consider. For instance, can he turn at 'f' to take sente instead of 12 or can he omit 12 altogether? White 2 at 'f' is another move that White might also play. For sure, this opening has progressed a long way since Dosaku's time, but there is still a lot more room for further research.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6

How to play the josekis in this pattern


Professionals analyze the josekis that arise in the many fashionable systematic opening patterns today not only as to how they develop along the sides but also as to how they develop throughout the whole board. Let's look at some variations of the joseki that starts with White 4 in Dia. 4.

When Black answers White's knight's move (4 in Dia. 4) with 1 in Dia. 5, what kind of


result can Black expect if he hanes with 3? After Black 4, the sequence to White 12 is inevitable. Black 13 is now a good move. After the exchange of White 14 for Black 15, Black has a better position. Next, White will use his sente to exchange 'a' for Black 'b', then turn at 'c'. Black will answer by jumping to 'd', attacking the white stones in the center.

Unfortunately, White will not answer Black 3 by cutting at 7 in Dia. 6. Instead, he will hane at 4. After exchanging 5 for White 6, Black must go back and connect at 7. White can now expand his corner with 8 and 10. Black could continue by capping at 'a'. This is a severe move, but White can play 'b' in sente, so it seems as if White will somehow be able to make life for his stones on the right side. For these reasons, Black 3 has been rejected.

Black can also cut across the knight's move with 5 in Dia. 7. The result to Black 11 leads to a close game. If White 8 at 9, Black will crawl to 8 and the position reverts to Dia. 5. However, the black territory here is not secure. After exchanging 'a' for Black 'b', there is the aji of the sequence White 'c'–Black 'd'–White 'e'. White could also peep at 'b' and fighting back with 'f' would be unreasonable.



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

After White slides to 4 in Dia. 8, Black 5 is another variation. Before extending to 8, White pushes up with 6, forcing Black to block with 7. With Black 9, the sequence comes to a pause. If White answers Black 5 by playing at 8, Black will play 6. This result would be worse for White than Dia. 4. If Black 7 at 8, White will


break out into the center by playing at 7, and Black's corner is wiped out.

You should note, however, that this variation is rarely played. Black's wall is thick, but the marked stone is low and it would be easy for White to erase the potential of this wall with a shoulder hit against this stone. Moreover, White has a big endgame point at 'a', so Black can't expect much territory around here. These are the reasons why Black will want to play 1 in *Dia. 5* as soon as possible.

In answer to White 4 in *Dia. 7*, Black might also block with 1 in *Dia. 9*. White will push up with 2 and Black can't expect a good result. If the sequence continues to 8, White gets a thick position on the right side, and a shoulder hit at 'a' is left behind. Black can't expect to get much territory around here.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10

Instead of 6 in *Dia. 9*, White could cut with 1 in *Dia. 10*. The sequence would continue to Black 8. Next, Black 10 is the tesuji against White 9. It would be a good idea for you to remember this move because it occurs in capturing races in a number of corner josekis. After exchanging 'a' for Black 'b', even if White tries to eat up the corner with 'c', Black has at least two ways to rescue his corner stones, and the best that White can hope for is to live in the corner with gote. Compared to *Dia. 9*, this is not a good result for White.

In *Dia. 11*, Black might play 3, expecting White to submissively defend at 'a'. However, White aggressively pushes up with 4 and wedges in with 6. After the sequence to 10, fierce fighting will probably erupt, but it is hard to tell how it will develop. However, Black does not need to fight — he should simply enclose the corner by playing 5 at 'b'. Black 'a' next would be severe, so White would most likely quell the black stone at 3 by playing 6. Black ends in sente, so he will want to play an

approach move against the white stone in the upper left corner.




Dia. 11

Black 3 is an important move. If Black simply plays 'b' in answer to White 2, it will be White who ends in sente. The trade of White's thickness for Black's sente is probably an even result, but I would choose Black.


Countering the Mini-Chinese Opening

Of the various modern opening patterns, the mini-Chinese opening has one of the highest winning percentages. For this reason, it is only natural that White will want to prevent Black from setting up this pattern.

If White answers Black 5 with A in *Dia. 12*, Black can set up the mini-Chinese opening pattern by playing at B. Therefore, White might consider making an approach move at 6 to prevent Black from making this pattern. This move is often seen in professional games.



Dia. 12




Dia. 13

In answer to White 6 in *Dia. 12*, one idea for Black is to make another approach move at 1 in *Dia. 13*. Attaching with 2 is the natural direction and White builds influence along the bottom with the sequence to 14. Black's choice of the joseki from 5 to 13 is also correct. If Black played 5 at 10, the joseki White 6-Black 'a'-White 'b' would be inappropriate in this opening.


Against Black 15, the sequence from White 16 to 20 is often seen. White 20 at 'c' is also possible. White has built a large moyo along the bottom, but Black is not unhappy. He has established solid positions on the left and the right, and he has a large endgame move with the cut at 'a'.

Attaching against the black stone on the right with White 2 in *Dia. 14* is the wrong direction. After White 4, Black attaches with 5 and plays the joseki to Black 13. After White 14, Black exchanges 15 for White 16, then pincers the white stone on the right with 17. Black's position at the bottom is ideal. As should be now clear, if White is going to attach, he should do so on the left side as in *Dia. 13*.




Dia. 14

Another white strategy might be to answer Black 1 in *Dia. 14* with the diagonal move of White 'a', then, if Black invades at 10, to switch to the right side, attacking the black stone there with White 'b'.




Dia. 15

There are a lot of examples in professional games of White attaching at 2 in *Dia. 13* in answer to Black's second approach at 1. However, following this sequence gives White good fighting chances and Black could lose the initiative. For this reason, Black might first pincer with 1 in *Dia. 15*. There are a lot of josekis that can be played here, but the sequence to White 4 is representative. At this point Black can make his second approach with 5. If White responds with the diagonal move of 6, Black plays 7 and he has taken the initiative. You should note that Black 5 at 'a' would be passive. White would invade at 7 and retake the initiative.



Dia. 16

If White wants to create complications, he can invade with 4 in *Dia. 16* after Black defends with 3. However, Black will play 5 and 7, and White will be faced with difficult choices. For example, Black is threatening to cap at 'a', and the white stone at 4 is also under pressure. As these examples show, the pincer of Black 1 is a powerful move.




Dia. 17

Since he already has a stone in place on the left, the pincer of White 2 in *Dia. 17* is a more severe move than an approach at 'a'. (Black 3 at 7 would be met by White 9.) After a joseki is played out around here, White would end in sente, so he would be able to make an approach against the black stone in the lower right corner.


In either case, making a second approach with 3 is the usual way to play. However, the result that follows White 4 and 6 is worse for White than the result he got by making an approach at 'a', so this diagram must be rejected.

What about attaching with White 2 in *Dia. 18*? Locally, the joseki to White 8 is not good for Black, but since he gets sente, he can make a corner enclosure with 9, giving him a good game.



Dia. 18


If there is a white stone at 'a' in *Dia. 19*, after the sequence to 5, White 'b' will be sente because the peep at 'c' is a severe threat. For this reason, invading immediately at 3 is an option for Black. Even if White plays 6 at 'd', the approach at 'b' will not be sente, giving Black an advantage. However, in this position White will make an approach move at 6 after exchanging 4 for Black 5. Even though Black can now extend to 'd', followed by White 'e'–Black 'f'–White 'g', this is no big deal because White gets the initiative at the bottom.



Dia. 19


After exchanging 3 for White 4 in *Dia. 20*, Black can also attach at 5. White 12 keeps Black confined to the corner, so Black plays 13 to

neutralize White's wall. White 14 and 16 force Black to live in gote with the sequence to 21. White can now approach at 22, forcing Black to answer with 23. In the lower left corner, White can play the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'–Black 'd'. Next, White 'e' is a forcing move which makes White's position thick facing up the left side, giving him a powerful checking extension at 'f'.



Dia. 20

Another possible move is the one-space pincer of White 2 in *Dia. 21*. Nowadays, making a corner enclosure with 3 is the move most often played in this situation. Since the ladder is favorable for Black in this opening, Black can wedge in with 5. The sequence to White 18 is one possible result.




Dia. 21

Since the mini-Chinese opening has a high winning percentage, Black will try as best he can to set up this pattern. If White plays 2 in *Dia. 22* on the opposite star point from 1, Black can make an approach move at 3, hoping to induce White to answer with 4. If he does, Black will play 5 in the lower right corner. If White now takes the empty corner in the upper right, Black will set up his mini-Chinese pattern at the bottom (Black 7 in *Dia. 1*). Instead of 4, White could also pincer at 'a', and, if Black plays 5 in the lower right corner, White would take the empty upper left corner. This would result in a completely different open-


ing pattern from the one we have been studying here.

Of course White can avoid the mini-Chinese opening in *Dia. 1* by simply occupying the upper left corner with 2 in *Dia. 23*.

When Black takes the lower right corner with 3, White takes the 3-4 point below the star point in the lower left corner. This leads to quite a different opening pattern than the one we have analyzed.









Dia. 22




Dia. 23

Six Basic Life-and-Death Problems

In each of the six problems below, it is Black's turn to play. Find the vital point that kills the white stones. In Problem 6, the best that Black can get is a ko. Answers are on page 40.




Six Basic Life-and-Death Problems: Answers




Problem 1

Following the proverb 'There's death in the hane!' Black hanes with 1 and 3, then strikes at the vital point of 5. White's only hope of getting two eyes is to play 6, but Black ataris with 7, then ataris with 9. After Black connects at 11, White is left with a three-point eye space.




Problem 4

There is a proverb that says 'Strange things happen on the 1-2 point.' This problem is a good example of these words of wisdom. With the sequence 9, Black makes a five-point eye space, so White is dead. If White 4 at 9, Black A kills the white stones.




Problem 2

The center of three stones is the vital point. After Black 3, there is nothing White can do to make two eyes for his stones.



Problem 5


Black a is the vital point. White blocks the link-up with 2 and 4, but Black then cuts with 5, and White can't atari because he is short of liberties.



Problem 3

5: captures at 3

Black 1 is a clever move. If White makes an eye in the corner with 2, Black turns at 3, sacrificing three stones. White captures with 4, but when Black retakes with 5, the point where the marked stone was becomes a false eye. Black 1 at 2 also works.




Problem 6


In this position, the best Black can get is a ko. Black starts by making a placement on the 1-2 point, then hanes on the other 1-2 point with 3, setting up the ko. After Black 5, White starts the ko with 6.

Eight Endgame Problems on 9x9 Boards


In the eight problems below, find the best endgame sequence for Black. Answers start on page 58.




Problem 1




Problem 5




Problem 2




Problem 6




Problem 3



Problem 7




Problem 4



Problem 8


Answers to 9x9 Board Endgame Problems

Problem 1. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 1

Black 1 in *Dia. 1* is the biggest move: it is worth eight points. White 2 is the next biggest: it is worth seven points. Compare this diagram with *Dia. 2*, where White moves first.



Dia. 2


After Black descends to 2 in *Dia. 2*, White can play the sequence White 'a'–Black 'b'–White 'c'–Black 'd'. Comparing this result with *Dia. 1*, we see that White has gained the two marked stones (four points) plus the four points 'a', 'b', 'c', and 'd', for a total of eight points.



Dia. 3


Continuing from *Dia. 1*, Black connects at 3 in *Dia. 3*, rescuing his two stones in the lower left: this is worth six points. White 4 is worth five points, while Black 5 and 7 are worth four points. Black ends up with 13 points of territory, while White has 12.

Problem 2. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 1

After Black 1, White will leave the situation as it is. No matter how White continues here, Black 1 is worth 10 points and White loses his three stones. In the upper right, White 2 is worth $9\frac{1}{2}$ points: five points of territory that White gets with 2, plus $4\frac{1}{2}$ points that Black would get if he plays 2 (the point 'a' is worth $\frac{1}{2}$ point). Therefore, not only is the lower right corner bigger by $\frac{1}{2}$ point, it also has a follow-up. Finally, Black 3 is worth six points.



Dia. 2


White 4 in *Dia. 2* is worth 5 points. Black 5 is worth four points, and White 6 is worth two points. Look at the next diagram to see why White has to play 4.



Dia. 3


If Black gets to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 3*, the lower left corner becomes a *seki* and White would get zero points.

Problem 3. Black wins by two points.




Dia. 1

Black 1 (or 'a') in *Dia. 1* is worth more than ten points. Compare the difference if White were to attach at 1 instead (see *Dia. 3*). White 2 is worth six points. Next, Black sacrifices a stone and gets a seki with 5 and 7. These moves are worth 5 points (six points of territory less one point for the captured stone).



Dia. 2


White 10 is worth 3 points. The game ends with White 14. Black wins by two points.



Dia. 3

If Black captures with 1 in *Dia. 3* in the lower left instead of defending the upper right corner, White will attach at 2. After the exchange of White 4 for Black 5, White will defend with 6 to prevent the seki created in *Dia. 1*. After Black connects with 13, the result is a draw.


Problem 4. The result is a draw.



Dia. 1


4: connects (left of 2)

Black starts in the lower right with 1. White has no choice but to capture with 2. Black next squeezes with 3 and secures the corner with 5. Since the White group on the left is now in danger, White must defend with 6. On the left side, Black 'a' is wrong; White will answer with 'b'. Black 'c' is also wrong. Therefore —



Dia. 2


Black uses his sente to make a placement at 7. In this way he can force White to capture the two black stones with 10 and 12.



Dia. 3


Black next hanes and connects with 13 and 15, and the game ends with Black 19. Although White wasn't able to play it, White 13 would have been a big sente move because it threatens an attachment at 'a'. If Black resists by blocking at 15, White can start a ko.

Problem 5. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 1

Black 1 is a clever tesuji which exploits White's shortage of liberties. Up to White 6, Black has been able to capture the white stone at the top in sente. White might play 4 at 'a', aiming at a ko at 'b', but Black would ignore it and take sente. This would lose White more points than simply playing 2 and 4. Eventually, Black must play 'c' and capture the white stones at the top.



Dia. 2

Next, Black attaches with 7. This is another clever tesuji. White must capture with 8 and 10. If White resists with 8 at 9, Black can get a ko by playing 'a'. Again Black ends in sente, enabling him to play 11, which is worth more than three points.




Dia. 3

13: right of 12; 14: at 12


White 12 is worth two points. Both sides capture two stones, but if Black were to play at 12, he would capture a white stone, giving him two points. Black 15 and 16 are the last points of the game. Black wins by one point.

Problem 6. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 1

First, let's look at the situation in the lower left corner if White moves first. White 1 is clearly the biggest move. Next, there is a 50% chance that White will be able to play 'a' or Black will be able to play 'b'. If White 'a', White's territory is worth seven points (including the point 'c'), whereas if Black 'b', White's territory is worth three points. Therefore, White 1 is worth five points.



Dia. 2


Let's now look at Black 1. Assuming that Black 'a' and White 'b' will be exchanged, Black's territory is worth eight points. Therefore, the value of what White would have gotten if he played 1 (Dia.1) and what Black gets by playing 1 is 13 points (5+8). White 2 in the upper right corner is the next biggest move, worth ten points. If White can play 'c', he would gain nine points, so —



Dia. 3


Black plays 3 and gets a seki with the sequence to 7. Finally, White 8 to 10 end the game. Black wins by one point.

Problem 7. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 1

Black can play the sequence from 1 to 6 in sente. Consider the difference if White were to hane at 'a'. Falling back to 2 is White's only response to 1. Against Black 3, White can't win the ko (throwing in at 5) because he doesn't have enough ko threats, so he has to block at 4 and connect with 6. If White 2 at 'b', Black will cut at 'c'.



Dia. 2


Black starts his operations in the upper right corner by quietly connecting at 7. White must make two eyes with 8 to 12, so he ends up with only two point of territory there.



Dia. 3


Black 13 and White 14 are both worth three points, but must play 13 before 14. Finally, Black 15 and 16 end the game. There is still a ko remaining at 'a', but White has more ko threats than Black, so he will win this ko. Nevertheless, Black wins by one point.

Problem 8. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 1

Black 1 is an important move that enables Black to get some profit in the corner. White must capture at 2; now Black can capture a stone with 3 which is worth ten points. You might think that it is big for White to play 2 at 3, but Black would then atari with 'a' and connect with 'b'. Because he is short of liberties, White's stones at the bottom are dead.



Dia. 2

White 4 is worth more than five points. The calculation of Black 5 is complicated, but it is worth a bit less than five points. In any case, Black 7 and 9 force White to capture with 8 and 10. After 11, Black will win the half-point ko in the lower right corner. Black wins by one point.




Dia. 3

Let's look more closely at Black 1 in Dia. 1. If Black omits this move and captures with 1, White will connect at 2. After Black plays 3, White can descend to 4. If Black plays 3 below 4, White will connect at 3. In both cases, Black will lose.

An Introduction to Basic Josekis (5)

This series is aimed at players around 20-kyu. It is intended to give them an understanding of the most commonly played josekis and how they are applied in the fuseki. Each move in the joseki is analyzed and the reason it is played is completely explained.


The one-space pincer of Black 1 against the marked white stone in the reference diagram is one of the most frequently played josekis in modern go. In our last installment, we analyzed some of the variations that develop when White jumps to 'a'. This time we will look at the invasion of White 'b' and the counter pincers at 'c' and 'd'.




Reference Diagram

Joseki Two

In response to White 1 in *Dia. 1*, Black will block at 2 if he doesn't have a stone around the star point below. If he does have a stone there, then he will block on the other side, below 1.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

After Black 2 in *Dia. 1*, the sequence from White 1 to 7 in *Dia. 2* is the joseki. Black is thick and with his marked stone in place, a reinforcement at 'a' is unnecessary. The order of moves here is important.


Black 1 in *Dia. 3* looks like a severe move, and, if White responds with 2 and 4, Black gets a superior result with the sequence to 5. However, Black 1 is unreasonable and, if White plays correctly, Black will find himself at a disadvantage.

The correct response to the black marked stone is for White to play 1 and 3 in *Dia. 4*. Next

the clamp of White 5 is the tesuji. If Black descends to 6, White cuts with 7. Black defends with 8, but Black's position collapses after White plays 9.




Dia. 3




Dia. 4

In response to the white marked stone, Black has to fall back and connect with 1 in *Dia. 5*, after which White defends with 2. This shape is similar to the joseki in *Dia. 2* except that Black has exchanged a stone for 2. This exchange is bad for Black, since he has lost a liberty. This could prove costly for him in any fighting that might break out around here.




Dia. 5



Dia. 6


Answering the invasion of the marked white stone with Black 1 in *Dia. 6* is bad in this position. Black confines White to the corner with 5, but White 6 neutralizes Black's wall facing down the right side. If Black had a stone around 6 to begin with, then Black 1 would be a reasonable move.

The sequence in *Dia. 7* is taken from a professional game. After White 1, Black exchanges 2 for White 3, then invades the corner with 4. The joseki to Black 12 is played, but White 13 becomes a good move: it strikes at the weak point of Black's corner enclosure in the upper left and extends from the white thickness in the top right.



Dia. 7

If White doesn't pincer with 1 in *Dia. 7*, but simply defends the right side with 1 in *Dia. 8* instead, the sequence to Black 6 would most likely follow. Black has developed well at both the top and the bottom and is satisfied with this result. This illustrates why White 1 in *Dia. 7* is such a positive move.




Dia. 8


The position in *Dia. 9* is another example from a professional game. It shows how the game might continue after the joseki in *Dia. 2*. White 1 attacks the black group in the top right, so Black must move out into the center with 2 to 8. After Black cuts with 10 —

White must fix up his bad aji with 1 in *Dia. 10*. Black plays 2 and 4, then goes after the two

marked white stones with 6. But turning in the center with White 7 is a thick move. After Black defends with 8, White is happy to sacrifice his two marked stones by playing 9 and 11. White has managed to build a huge moyo at the top and has secured solid territory in sente in the lower right.



Dia. 9




Dia. 10


Joseki Three

The counter pincer of White 1 in *Dia. 11* is another joseki move that is also quite popular these days. Although there are a lot of variations, the sequence to White 7 is the one most often seen in professional games.

Instead of 5 in *Dia. 11*, White can't resist with 1, 3, and 5 in *Dia. 12*. When Black blocks with 6, White has no room to maneuver.




Dia. 11




Dia. 12

White might try to take the corner with 3 and 5 in *Dia. 13*. Taking the corner in a opening is usually good, but in this case Black captures a stone and makes a thick position, while White is left with bad aji in the corner.




Dia. 13




Dia. 14

If Black attaches the marked stone with 1 in *Dia. 14*, then pushing through with White 2 to 8 is appropriate. Black must answer with 9; Black's position in the corner collapses when White descends to 10.

After the joseki in *Dia. 11*, Black can continue with 1 (or 'a') in *Dia. 15* if it is his turn to play. White will answer with 2, but White has been forced to defend, so Black has gained more from this move than White. If White plays 2 at 'b', Black will stand at 'c'.



Dia. 15




Dia. 16


If it is White's turn to play in *Dia. 15*, he will first descend to 1, then atari with 3. Next, he can aim at 'a' and confine Black to the top.

Here is an example of the sequence in *Dia. 16* played in a three-stone handicap game. O

Rissei was white and his opponent was Osawa Narumi, the women's amateur Honinbo. In *Dia. 17*, the joseki in *Dia. 14* was played in the upper right corner.



Dia. 17



Dia. 18


Pushing up at 1 in *Dia. 18* was an excellent move. However, White took this opportunity to force with 2 and 4 before making an approach move with 6. The game is far from decided, but we give this example to show that White might play these moves quite early on in the game.

Joseki Four


White could also play a counter pincer on the third line with 1 in *Dia. 19*. The joseki to White 7 is similar to the one in *Dia. 11*, where White played 1 at 'a'.

When Black attaches with the marked stone in *Dia. 20*, White might consider extending to 1 and 3 in response. However, Black confines White to the corner with 2 and 4.


Moreover, the marked white stone looks quite lonely in the shadow of Black's wall. Black has taken the initiative.



Dia. 19




Dia. 20



Dia. 21

With the counter pincer stone on the third line, the hane of Black 1 in *Dia. 21* is possible, but it can lead to a difficult fight. After White connects at 8, Black must connect at 'a'. Next, White will cut at 'b'.




Dia. 22


The position in *Dia. 22* shows the joseki in *Dia. 21* in a professional game. After Black descended to 9 —

White was able to live in the corner, but Black confined him there with the sequence to 8 in *Dia. 23*. The joseki now came to a pause. The second stage of the fighting will take place when White pulls out his stone with 'a'.

Dia. 24 is a game between a top amateur and a top professional. White changed the order of 3 and 5 in the joseki shown in *Dia. 21*.




Dia. 23



Dia. 24

Extending with Black 1, then engulfing the marked white stone with 3 in *Dia. 25* showed good judgment. The sequence to 13 gave Black an excellent result.



Dia. 25

A Fighting Art

In this occasional column, we look at games worthy of attention not for their importance but for their sheer, unmitigated aggressiveness. In the first game, the initial clash develops into a whole-board fight that lasts the whole game. Moreover, it ends up as a ko fight in which the loser was not the one who went home unhappy.

1. Kobayashi Koichi vs. Yokota

Kobayashi Koichi needs no introduction, but readers who know who Yokota Shigeaki is can pride themselves on being well informed about the Japanese go scene. Yokota is a 30-year-old 9-dan from the Kansai Ki-in who became a professional at the age of 13 (in 1983) after winning the 1st Elementary School Pupils Meijin championship in 1980. He reached 9-dan in 1995.

White: Kobayashi Koichi Judan

Black: Yokota Shigeaki 9-dan

Played at the Nihon Ki-in on 15 April 1999.

3rd prelim. round, 47th Oza.




Figure 1 (1-50)

Figure 1 (1-50). Invading the moyo

When Black goes for a large moyo with 19, White doesn't hesitate: he goes

immediately for profit with 20, in true Kobayashi style.

After his invasion at 28, White seeks *sabaki* by attaching at 32. Both sides are satisfied with the result to 56 in Figure 2.




Figure 2 (51-75)

Figure 2 (51-75). Kobayashi plays aggressively.

When Black goes all out with 63 and 65, White could reinforce himself with 66 at A, Black B, White C, but counterattacking with 66 is more aggressive. The sequence to 82 in Figure 3 is a one-way street.

Figure 3 (76-100). No backing off

White 92 is a strong move: Black has no choice but to play 95. White 96 is essential: White must seal Black in; if White defended the corner instead, Black would move out with 96 and attack the white group to the right.

White 100. If at 1 in *Dia. 1*, a ko follows after Black 20. Black has threats at 'a', so this will be a difficult fight.

Figure 4 (101-150). Heading for a capturing race

Black's corner group doesn't have two eyes, but he stakes the game on exploiting White's bad aji by moving out with 25.




Figure 3 (76-100)






Figure 4 (101-150)
22: connects (right of 4)



Dia. 1: a difficult ko fight
14: at 7



Dia. 2: White loses

Black 35 is a well-timed forcing move. If White answers with 1 in *Dia. 2*, he captures five stones, but his bottom left corner group perishes.

White 44, 46. White must play these moves to keep ahead in the capturing race.

Black 47 misses a chance — if Black A, White B, Black 47, White C, then Black captures White with Black 50 and wins.




Figure 5 (151-200)

Figure 5 (151-200). One group lives, but . . .

Black 89. If at 90, White plays 89 and A, and Black loses the capturing race. Instead, Black takes sente with 89 so that he can launch the capturing race with the other group with 91.




Figure 6 (201–256)

9: captures 8; 10: atari; 12: at 8; 32: at 28;
40: connects at 23; 56: connects (left of 54)

Figure 6 (201–256). Winning the fight but losing the game

White 14. The ko is a *tenka-ko*, that is, so big that White has to ignore all ko threats. The successive moves of 13 and 15 give Black a very slight lead. Both sides play the endgame with precision.

As it turns out, Black wins the game despite losing the enormous ko fight.

Black wins by ½ point.

2. Hikosaka vs. Hane Naoki

This game features some complicated fighting and may be a little difficult to follow. The highlight is not a sequence actually played on the board but a spectacular sacrifice proposed by the commentator.

Hikosaka started out badly in the Winners' Section of the 36th Judan tournament, losing his first game, but then he won all his games in the Losers' Section, beating Fujisawa Shuko, Kobayashi Koichi, Hane Naoki, O Rissei, O Meien, and, in the playoff with the winner of the Winners' Section, Cho Chikun. That's quite a line-up to beat, and in the title match his good form continued and he defeated Kato Masao 3–2 to take the title.

Hane Naoki (born on 14 August 1976) is the son of Hane Yasumasa 9-dan. He has established himself as one of the top players of his generation and may very well go on to surpass his father, who won the Oza title in 1990.

White: Hikosaka Naoto 9-dan

Black: Hane Naoki 7-dan

Played in Nagoya on 20 November 1997.

36th Judan, 3rd round, Losers' Section.




Figure 1 (1–50)

Figure 1 (1–50). A spectacular suggestion

The fuseki of this game is a little unusual. The fighting on the left side is complicated, but one of the themes is the desire of both sides to take sente in order to switch to the top (Black A or White B). As it turns out, these moves are long delayed because of the way the fight develops.

Black 31. Black would be happy to see White C, which is why he doesn't atari there.


Black 43. Miyamoto Naoki 9-dan, the newspaper commentator on this game, made an interesting suggestion for this move.

Dia. 1. Black sacrifices two stones with 1 and 3 to set up a squeeze with 5 and 7. He then answers on the right side with 9 and 11, as in the game. White 10 breaks the ladder, so —


Dia. 2. White naturally pulls his stone out with 1, but Black presses at 2, setting up a

second sacrifice, on a grander scale. Adding a stone at 8 gains extra sente moves, so Black builds a magnificent wall on the outside.

This extravagant sacrifice is typical of Miyamoto. It would be interesting to see a game played as a continuation from *Dia. 2*.



Dia. 1: the first sacrifice



Dia. 2: the second sacrifice

Figure 2 (51–100). Black creates a heavy group.

White 76. White has no good move to link up. White 78 is necessary: it omitted, Black sacrifices a stone (below 62), then throws in (below 68).

However, White 80 is very big and gives White the lead. After the game, the players concluded that Black should have played 77 at A.

Black 81 should be at B or C. It's very hard for Black to save his two stones after White 82 and 84. Black's moves from 85 on are on dame points.

After 98, Black loses interest in saving his stones; instead, he tries to pull off something on the centre left.

Figure 3 (101–132). The attack fails.

Black's attack in the centre doesn't gain much.

Black 27. If at 1 in *Dia. 3*, White wins the capturing race.

Black resigns after White 132.

(Translated by John Power)




Figure 2 (51–100)





Figure 3 (101–132)



Dia. 3: Black loses

The Korean Go Boom

*adapted from a report by
Oshima Masao*

Without a doubt, the dominant country in international go in the 90s has been Korea, and there is every indication that its supremacy will continue into the next millenium. In an attempt to explain the reasons for Korea's rise to the peak of the go world, Igo Club presented a lengthy report, written by Oshima Masao, on Korean go in its March 1998 issue. This article is a free



Lee Chang-ho, aged 24, the world's number one player and the major figure in establishing Korean supremacy in international go. He has won nearly a third (13/41) of the international tournaments held to date.

Ten years of supremacy

'Twilight Japan', 'Rising sun China', 'Trio guarantees ten years of supremacy for Korea': these were the headlines featured in a special report by a Korean newspaper on international go in November 1997.

The confidence of Koreans that they will continue to dominate international go is based not only on their spectacular success to date, but on the extraordinary popularity of the game in their country.

adaptation of Oshima's, with additional information and updates in sidebars.

We should mention that this report is written from a Japanese perspective. It would be nice if someone who can read Korean would report on the Korean go scene directly from Korean sources, but in the meantime we have to make do with Japanese sources. (JP)

There have been three major booms in Korean go that have taken the game from a relatively minor pastime to the forefront of leisure activities. They are:

- The first boom, when Cho Chikun won the Japanese Kisei and Meijin titles simultaneously in 1983
- A second boom when Cho Hoon-hyun won the 1st Ing Cup in 1989
- An explosive increase in the popularity of go in the 90s triggered by the emergence of the prodigy Lee Chang-ho and his success in international tournaments.

Professional go players in Korea

The Hanguk Kiwon is the only professional go body in Korea. It was founded in 1954. As of 31 March 1999 it had 166 members. The dan breakdown is as follows. For the sake of comparison, the figures for March 1985, when the Hanguk Kiwon had 87 members, are given in brackets.

1-dan: 24 (8)	2-dan: 18 (9)
3-dan: 16 (12)	4-dan: 20 (22)
5-dan: 15 (10)	6-dan: 24 (15)
7-dan: 18 (6)	8-dan: 11 (2)
9-dan: 20 (3)	

The 20 9-dans include Rui Naiwei and her husband, Jiang Zhujiu, who became guest members in early 1999.

At present there are 20 women professionals (including Rui and Janice Kim, who lives in the US), compared to 2 in 1985.

Prize money in Korean tournaments

International tournaments

- Samsung Cup: 300 million won
- LG Cup: 200 million won
- Tong Yang Securities Cup: 120 million won
- Jinro Cup: 100 million won to the winning team — at present discontinued
- Bohai Cup (Women's Ch'ship): \$30,000

Domestic tournaments

- Wangwi (Throne): 30 million won
- Tekron Cup: 30 million won
- Paedal Monarch: 20 million won
- Kisung (= Kisei): 18 million won
- Kuksu (National Champion): 18 million won
- Myungin (= Meijin): 11 million won
- BC Card Cup: 11 million won
- Kukgi (National Go): 11 million won
- Chaigowi (Top Position): 10 million won
- Paewang (Monarch): 8 million won
- Bacchus Cup: 11 million won
- Daewang (Great King): 8 million won
- SBS Cup (TV): 20 million won
- KBS Paduk (TV): (not given)
- Women's Ch'ship: 7 million won

\$1 = 1190 won = 110 yen (1 Sept. 1999)

Note. This chart is provided solely for the sake of comparison. It was given in the March 1997 issue of Igo Club and does not incorporate subsequent changes in prize money and tournaments themselves.

The result is that go, or *paduk* (or *baduk*), to give it its Korean name, is now the number one hobby of male Koreans, and the country boasts a go-playing population of over nine million, or almost one in every four of its inhabitants, a figure that puts every other country in the shade. [In Japan the 'conventional' estimate for the last three decades has been ten million, but this total seems to be exaggerated; even if reliable, it amounts to only one-twelfth of the Japanese population.]

The outstanding results of the top Korean players, some of whom are still quite young, would certainly support the newspaper's rosy forecast of ten years' supremacy, but Koreans have another good reason to be optimistic about the future. The mid-90s have witnessed an extraordinary boom in chil-

dren's go. As of 1998, there were 1500 go schools for children, with an estimated 100,000 pupils. This is actually a revolving population. In Korea, parents enrol children of elementary-school age in go schools because it is widely accepted that there are strong educational benefits, especially in developing concentration and abstract thinking ability. Junior high and high school pupils concentrate on preparing for entrance examinations (Korea seems to resemble Japan in this respect), but, of course, the most talented of the youngsters become *inseis* (apprentice professionals) at the Hanguk Kiwon. At present, there are 160 *inseis* [this number increased to 220 in 1999].

One hundred thousand elementary school pupils is an extraordinary pool of players to draw upon. It helps account for the extremely high standard of the *insei* group. The top 30 are said to be able to play top players like Lee Chang-ho and Yoo Chang-hyuk just on black, and the new professionals every year seem to be extremely strong.

Emphasis on international tournaments

One of the decisive differences between Japan and Korea is the emphasis placed on international tournaments. If you look at the chart of prize money for Korean domestic and international tournaments, the disparity is striking. The top international tournament, the Samsung Cup, has a first prize of 300 million won (it was \$400,000 for the 1st Cup, but was changed to Korean won after the Korean currency collapse in 1997). The top local tournament is the Wangwi (Throne) title, which has a first prize of 30 million won: a mere tenth!

There are only three Korean-sponsored open international tournaments at present, compared to 14 domestic open titles, but taking first place in the Samsung Cup is actually worth 50% more than winning all 14 of these titles. (In practice, the same player, Lee Chang-ho, wins most of them — ten domestic titles and two Korean international titles in 1997 — but that's another story). It would be surprising if Korean players didn't place a lot of importance on doing well in



Though overshadowed by his disciple Lee in the 90s, Cho Hoon-hyun, aged 46, is one of the greatest go players of history. He dominated Korean go in the 70s and 80s and completed a clean sweep of titles three times. His victory in the 1st Ing Cup gives him a claim to be the world's number one in the 80s.

the international titles. In 1997, Lee (10), Cho Hoon-hyun (3) and Yoo Chang-hyuk (1) monopolized the domestic titles, as they usually do, but many of the new young stars of Korean go were still able to earn substantial prize money thanks to good performances in international titles. For example, a 24-year-old 5-dan named Kim made 28 million won by winning three games in the 2nd Samsung Cup (he lost in the semifinals) — worth almost as much as winning the top domestic title.

The rush by Korean sponsors to found international titles started with Cho Hoon-hyun's victory in the 1st Ing Cup in 1989. In 1992, the Tong Yang Securities Cup was converted into an international tournament; it was followed by the SBS Jinro Cup, a team tournament, and a women's tournament, the Bohai Cup. In 1996, two major conglomerates stepped forward and founded the LG Cup and the Samsung Cup.

[Oshima doesn't make a comparison with Japan, but readers may be interested. The Fujitsu Cup, Japan's only international tournament, ranks fourth in prize money: 20 million yen to 33 million for the Kisei, 28 million for the Meijin, and 25 million for the Honinbo. In fact, victory in a domestic Japanese title is worth a lot more, because there's substantial match fee — see *The Go Player's Almanac* — and you are guaranteed at least the second prize plus another match fee the following year. Given a choice between victory in an international tournament and a big-three Japanese title, most Japanese players would opt for the latter. When he was Kisei and Meijin, Kobayashi Koichi, for example, showed little interest in international tournaments.]

Go's popularity with children — and parents

The boom in children's go in Korea really got off the ground after the emergence of Lee Chang-ho, the greatest prodigy in go history. In early 1990, Lee, who was still a junior high school pupil, launched his career by winning the Top Position title at the age of 15, a feat that initiated intensive press coverage of his career and the go scene in general. One way of looking at the boom is as a contest to become the second Lee Chang-ho.

Just as important, however, is the fact that go has a very positive image among parents in Korea. This is quite a turnaround, as Cho Nam-chul, the founder of the Hanguk Kiwon, had to combat widespread prejudice in Korea against go as a gambling game (which, of course, it was, among other things).

Go is commonly credited with fostering the following virtues:

1. concentration
2. logic
3. the ability to reason
4. perseverance
5. early intellectual development
6. good manners.

Continued bottom of next page

Results in international tournaments

Ing Cup (Chinese Taipei)

- 1 (1988–89). Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea)
- 2 (1992–93). Seo Bong-soo (Korea)
- 3 (1996). Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea)

Fujitsu Cup

- 1 (1988). Takemiya Masaki (Japan)
- 2 (1989). Takemiya Masaki (Japan)
- 3 (1990). Rin Kaiho (Japan)
- 4 (1991). Cho Chikun (Japan)
- 5 (1992). Otake Hideo (Japan)
- 6 (1993). Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea)
- 7 (1994). Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea)
- 8 (1995). Ma Xiaochun (China)
- 9 (1996). Lee Chang-Ho (Korea)
- 10 (1997). Kobayashi Koichi (Japan)
- 11 (1998). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
- 12 (1999). Yoo Chang-hyuk (Korea)

Tong Yang Securities Cup (Korea)

Note. The first two terms are not included in our statistics, as it became a full-scale international tournament only in its third year.

- [1 (1990). Yang Jae-ho (Korea)
- 2 (1991). Seo Bong-soo (Korea)]
- 3 (1992). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
- 4 (1993). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
- 5 (1994). Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea)
- 6 (1995). Ma Xiaochun (China)
- 7 (1996). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
- 8 (1997). Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea)
- 9 (1998). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)

Samsung Cup (Korea)

- 1 (1996). Yoda Norimoto (Japan)
- 2 (1997). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
- 3 (1999). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)

LG Cup (Korea)

- 1 (1996–May 1997). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
- 2 (1997–March 1998). O Rissei (Japan)
- 3 (1998–May 1999). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)

Chunlan Cup (China)

- 1 (1999). Cho Hoon-hyun (Korea)

TV Asia (Japan/China/Korea)

- 1 (1989). Takemiya Masaki (Japan)
- 2 (1990). Takemiya Masaki (Japan)
- 3 (1991). Takemiya Masaki (Japan)
- 4 (1992). Takemiya Masaki (Japan)
- 5 (1993). Yoda Norimoto (Japan)
- 6 (1994). Otake Hideo (Japan)

- 7 (1995). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
- 8 (1996). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)
- 9 (1997). Yu Bin (China)
- 10 (1998). Yoda Norimoto (Japan)
- 11 (1999). Yoda Norimoto (Japan)

SBS Jinro Cup (Korea)

This is a knockout team tournament.

- 1 (1992–93). Korea
- 2 (1993–94). Korea
- 3 (1994–95). Korea
- 4 (1995–96). Korea
- 5 (1996–97). Korea (Seo 9 wins in a row.)

World's Strongest Player (Korean)

- 1st (1996). Lee Chang-ho (Korea)

(The Japanese Meijin, Chinese Mingren and Korean Kuk-soo played each other twice each. This tournament was held only once.)

Bohai Cup World Women's Championship (Korea)

- 1 (1995). Rui Naiwei (China)
- 2 (1996). Feng Yun (China)
- 3 (1997). Rui Naiwei (China)
- 4 (1998). Rui Naiwei (China)
- 5 (1998). Zhang Xuan (China)

IBM Haya-go (fast go) Open Tournament (Japan) (limited international participation)

- 1 (1988). Ishida Yoshio (Japan)
- 2 (1989). Otake Hideo (Japan)
- 3 (1990). Kobayashi Satoru (Japan)

Summary

Excluding the first two terms of the Tong Yang Cup, the Bohai Cup, and the IBM Cup, a total of 41 individual championships have been played (as of August 1999). The results:

Korea: 22 wins (Lee 13, Cho 5, Yoo 3)
Japan: 16 wins (Takemiya 6, Yoda 4)
China: 3

Most of the parents who enrol their elementary-school children in go classes don't envisage a future as a go professional for them; rather, they believe that it will help them to develop good intellectual habits and become good students. On top of that, go is recognized socially as a worthwhile pastime.

Foreign members of the Hanguk Kiwon

In 1998 a 17-year-old Taiwanese girl, Zhang Zhengping, became the first foreigner to become a professional in Korea when she won the women's tournament (at the same time, she became Taiwan's first-ever woman professional). Some established professionals have become guest members of the Hanguk Kiwon. Wu Songsheng 9-dan of China was a guest member in the early 90s (after leaving China he first moved to Australia, which he represented in the 1st Ing Cup).

Janice Kim of the USA qualified as a shodan at the Hanguk Kiwon in 1987. Jimmy Cha 4-dan, who has become an American citizen, remains a member. As noted above, Rui Naiwei and Jiang Zhujiu are now guest members. Also, Svetlana Chikchina and Alexander Dinnerstein of Russia became the first Western inseis last year.

Becoming a professional player

In 1983, when I [Oshima] made a previous visit to Korea, there were 50 inseis at the Hanguk Kiwon. When I went back to get material for this article at the end of 1987 I found that this number had increased to 160. By comparison, the Nihon Ki-in has a total of 82 inseis in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya.

Of these inseis, the top one hundred are divided into ten groups of ten according to strength. Groups 1 to 6 are A class, for which the age limit is 18; the other four are B class, with an age limit of 15. That means that if you don't make it to A class before you turn 16, you have to look for another career.

All ten groups play in month-long leagues, held at the weekend. The top four place-getters go up one group the following month and the bottom four go down.

The bottom 60 players compete in a three-month Swiss tournament. The top 12 place-getters go up into Group 10 in B class but at the rate of four a month, so it takes three months for the changeover.

There are three ways to become a professional shodan. The first is to come first or second in a tournament open only to inseis. The second is an open tournament, held twice a year, in which amateurs can also

participate. There is no age limit for the amateurs, but recently the level of the inseis has been so high that amateurs don't have much of a chance. The first and second place-getters qualify, so four players a year become professionals this way. The third way is to take first place in a women's tournament, held twice a year.

Korean players in Japan

The most successful Korean players living in Japan are Cho Chikun Kisei & Meijin, Ryu Shikun 7-dan, and Cho Sonjin Honinbo. The other Korean-born members of the Nihon Ki-in are Cho Shoen 5-dan (Cho Chikun's elder brother), Kim Shujun 5-dan, a disciple of Cho Chikun's who is one of the leading players of the younger generation, and Kim Myong-jong 1-dan, the only woman (her younger sister is a 2-dan at the Hanguk Kiwon).

A number of prominent Korean players have also studied in Japan. They include:

- Cho Hoon-hyun 9-dan (1963-72), who was a disciple of Segoe Kensaku and who reached 5-dan in Japan (known in Japan as So Kungen).

- Cho Nam-chul 9-dan (1937-43), who was a disciple of Kitani Minoru. Cho is the founder of professional go in Korea (Cho Chikun is his nephew) (known in Japan as Cho Nantetsu).

- Kim In 9-dan (1962-63), who was a disciple of Kitani Minoru. He was awarded immediate promotion to 3-dan in Japan. (His name is pronounced the same in Japanese.)

- Yun Ki-hoon 9-dan, who lived in Japan from 1968 to 1972 (Yun Kigen in Japanese).

The Korean go population

Estimating the number of go fans in a country is very hard. The traditional figures have been ten million each for Japan and China and seven million for Korea.

In the case of Japan, I believe that a better indication of the size of the core group of go fans can be got by looking at the ratings for the NHK go program on Sunday. I recall that at one time this figure was 3% of the TV audience, which translates into three million fans.



Yoo Chang-hyuk, aged 33, is shown here being interviewed after his second win in the Fujitsu Cup. He is the third member of the trio on which Korea is pinning its hopes for continued international success.

Concerning China I have no idea. [Live programs on international tournaments held in China have attracted nine-figure audiences, but presumably only a minority of these were actual go players.] In Korea an interesting poll was carried out by a go magazine on 15 April 1997. The group sampled was small, but the results give some indication of the popularity of go. The poll found that 50.6% of adult men could play go and 7.8% of adult women. That translates to 28.9% of people over 20, which indicates a go population of roughly nine million.

This total, which doesn't even include children, is out of a total population of only 44 million. Go players in Korea's neighbours can only sigh in envy. The question, then, is why has go been so strikingly successful in gaining popularity in Korea.

One important factor is conscription. All male high school graduates have to serve three years two months in the army. A surprisingly large number of men say that they learnt go in the army. Many people at the Hanguk Kiwon emphasize the importance of this. Every army unit has a room to play go and plenty of go sets.

Fifty percent of adult men play go: this is a statistic to make a go player happy. With an interested public like this and so many children learning go in go schools, the future of Korean go is assured.

(Igo Club, March 1997)

Recent developments

Below is an update of the preceding article based on various articles, including one by Oshima Masao, published in Go Weekly.

•Korean go weathering the storm

The economic crisis that began in 1996 cast a cloud over the go scene. It followed a period of great expansion in go. In 1996 two new international tournaments, the Samsung and LG Cups were founded; some of the enthusiasm rubbed off on the domestic tournaments, which gained additional sponsors and were able to increase their prize money. The future of go in Korea seemed unlimited.

Everything changed with the economic slump and the IMF-imposed austerity measures. Even Korea's biggest corporations and conglomerates were in bad financial trouble. On top of that, the Korean won plummeted, so the value of the prizes was affected.

Considering the depth of the crisis, go has perhaps got off lightly. The only existing professional tournament to be cancelled was the SBS Jinro Cup. The Jinro Company enjoyed a dominant market share in sales of a popular distilled liquor (the Japanese version is known as *shochu*), but it made a rash decision to enter the beer market at the same time as competition expanded and it got caught up in a punishing war of attrition. However, in July 1999 the Hanguk Kiwon found a new sponsor, so this tournament will continue with the same team format but under a different name.

The Samsung Group is also not without its troubles, but it has kept the Samsung Cup going. As mentioned above, it converted the nominated first prize of \$400,000 (paid to the winner of the 1st Cup) into the then-equivalent of 300 million won. This decision was

very timely and saved Samsung a lot of money.

In November 1997 a currency crisis occurred just as Kobayashi Satoru and Lee Chang-ho were fighting it out in the final of the 2nd Samsung Cup. When Kobayashi arrived in Seoul to play the title match, the rate was ¥1 = 7 won. During the title match it went down to ¥1 = 14 won.

In general, the overall budgets and prize money for all international and domestic tournaments have been reduced by 10% to 50%. There are some domestic tournaments that have lost sponsors, but they are all trying to keep going. Apart from the SBS Jinro Cup, which missed a couple of terms, the only casualty seems to be the world women's amateur championship, the Korea Life Insurance Cup, which was held just once, in 1997. However, there were apparently other new international tournaments planned by Korean sponsors that now may never see the light of day. For example, the Lotte group was planning to found the Lotte Cup, a team tournament between Korea and China.

The game itself hasn't lost any popularity with the Korean public and the top players continue to fulfil their fans' expectations in the international tournaments, so when the Korean economy recovers we may yet see a further expansion in the sponsorship of go.

•The lower the dan the stronger?

These days it's often said that the new professionals at the Hanguk Kiwon are very strong and that the young low-dan players are much stronger than many of their higher-ranked seniors. Recently there has been fresh confirmation of just how strong some of the novice professionals are.

In the first round of the Korean qualifying tournament for the 4th Samsung Cup, Rui Naiwei 9-dan, who has long been established as the world's top woman player, was beaten by a 14-year-old girl, Cho Hae-ryun 1-dan. During the one-hour break for lunch, Rui dropped in at the room set aside for professionals to relax in; she reacted with a wry smile when she saw Cho glued to the TV set watching cartoons. The girl watching TV couldn't have looked like a go professional

in the process of beating one of the world's top players.

During the afternoon, Rui tried everything she knew, launching challenge after challenge, but she was unable to throw Cho off her stride.

Compared to men's go, women's go has lagged behind in Korea, but in the 90s there seems to have been a determined policy to increase the number of women players and raise the level. That was also one of the motives of the Korean sponsors who founded the Bohai Cup, the world women's professional go championship. So far, this tournament, which has been held five times, has been monopolised by Chinese women, but the appearance of young players like Cho in Korea may soon change that.

•Further increase in insei numbers

This year there has been a further increase in the number of inseis at the Hanguk Kiwon and the total is now 220 in Seoul. To update our main article, there has been no change in the A and B classes (the top 100 inseis), but the bottom group competing in the Swiss tournament for the four places in group ten now includes 120 inseis.

•Hanguk Kiwon establishes regional centres

Until now all professional go activity in Korea has centred on Seoul. Unlike Japan, most title-match games are also played in the capital. However, the Hanguk Kiwon has now established regional centres in five major cities, and insei leagues are also being held. Next year qualifying tournaments for promotion to professional rank are planned for these regional centres.

(Korean reports compiled and translated by John Power)

The Korean Style


Korean Joseki Innovations

Oya Koichi 8-dan

In this series from Kido, Oya Koichi 8-dan analyses new joseki moves that originated in Korea, which has been the source of many joseki innovations in recent years. Oya's aim is to help

amateurs understand the reasoning behind these new moves. In the process, he also places the distinctive Korean approach to go under the spotlight.

1. Neither fish nor fowl




Theme diagram

White: Yoda Norimoto; Black: Rin Kaiho

Theme diagram. This position is from a game played in the 22nd Meijin League on 1 May 1997. Black 2 is an unfamiliar move. It looks like a half measure: it doesn't defend the corner, nor, with the gap at 'a', does it seal White in.

Strangely enough, however, Black is satisfied with the continuation to 8. In this instalment, I would like to take a close look at Black 2.


This move was invented in Korea. It began to appear frequently in games around 1996. How would you come up with the concept of a move like 2? The answer lies in the typical Korean fondness for territory, in Korean rigorousness. There are as yet no signs of this move becoming popular in Japan, but the day is bound to come when it's played in a title match.



Reference diagram

Ref. dia. White 1 is the most peaceful move. If Black 'a', White has room to extend to 'b'; if instead Black 'c', he can slide to 'd'. White will therefore not be subjected to a severe attack. However, Black can get a large corner with 'a', so a player who dislikes this prospect will want to encroach more on the corner. That's the motive behind White 1, the so-called 'hem approach move' (*suso-gakari*) in the theme diagram.


Black has various ways of handling this move.



Dia. 1: defending the corner


Dia. 1. Black rams into White with 1, then blocks with 3. This is the most conventional

answer. Black dislikes giving White the opportunity to probe with 4, but that can't be helped. By the way, note that if Black plays 5 at 'a', White will extend to 'b'. The possibility of cutting with White 5 creates various sente moves in the corner — the original hem approach stone is now light.



Dia. 2: building thickness

Dia. 2. This variation appeared in Game Four of the 1998 Kisei title match [GW83, page 25]. Black's attitude is: I'll give you the corner if I can build outside thickness. If we assume that White later crawls at 'a', he looks like getting more than ten points of territory. As far as the lower side is concerned, Black's result is extremely slack; he'll have to take a lot of compensation in the centre and on the left.




Dia. 3: going all out


Dia. 3. I'm sure my readers are familiar with this joseki. It's often seen in both professional and amateur games. Actually, this variation is the closest in spirit to Black 2 in the theme diagram. Black plays aggressively at the bottom with 5 and 7; he then sacrifices the stone at 1, again going all out with 9 etc. (13 could also be at 'a'). Black is satisfied with having played both at the bottom and on the side. White captures a stone in sente with 12, so he probably can't complain.

Dia. 4. This supplements the previous diagram. If Black pulls back at 2, he can seal White into the corner. The judgement of whether the corner territory is big or small is


delicate . . . At any rate, Black gets the outside and White the profit. Moreover, White's stone at 1 has excellent aji.




Dia. 4: aji



Dia. 5: good shape



Dia. 6: even




Dia. 7: reasonable

Dia. 5. If Black gets to connect at 2, he will be satisfied. He could hardly hope to make better shape than this.

Dia. 6. Black can also extend at 3. The logic is similar to *Dia. 2*. Black gets strong centre influence, though the slackness in the corner is hard to accept. The balance between the two makes the result even.

Dia. 7. It may look a bit timid, but even Black 1 is feasible. White extends to 2 or 'a'; this is also a reasonable game.

Well, that more or less covers the standard answers to the hem approach move. Each gives a more or less even result, so the choice is one of individual preference.




Dia. 8: winning comes first

Dia. 8. Korean professionals, or, rather, professionals from countries other than Japan, are, as a rule, very territorial, and each move they play is focussed on winning. Their concern with each move is winning,

not shape or good style or beauty. Black 2 is a prime example of this. This move blocks White's path on the second line. In other words, Black is going all out to take territory at the bottom. On top of that, Black 2 limits the size of White's territory even if he does live in the corner. Black's strategy is logical.

Dia. 9. Poking your head out with White 1 is natural. However, this is just what Black is hoping for. If you compare the result with *Dia. 7*, the difference is clear. In *Dia. 7*, White's group is more or less settled, but here it lacks eye shape and the marked black stone is blocking its path.




Dia. 9: what Black wants *Dia. 10: separated*

Dia. 10. Pressing at 3 doesn't secure a better result. Black counters with 4, then cuts with 8. White's stones have been split up, and the situation is out of his control.

It seems that poking one's head out towards the centre with 1 is a bad move. Usually this is the safest thing to do, but this case is the exception. It's all rather strange.

Dia. 11. That being so, it looks as if White 1 is the only move. If Black 2, how about poking one's head out now with White 3? After 4 to 6, the problem is how to take control of the marked black stone. There doesn't seem to be a good move.



Dia. 11: alternative

Dia. 12: tewari


Dia. 12. According to tewari analysis, the result in *Dia. 11* is equivalent to the sequence here. After the moves to 4, White exchanges 'a' for Black 'b' and Black exchanges 'c' for

White 'd'.

White 'a' loses the aji of a contact play at 'e', so it's a bad move for White. Black 'c' helps the opponent, but in a sense the exchange for 'd' makes White heavy. In other words, White 1 and 3 in *Dia. 11* are close to what Black wants.

Dia. 13. It looks as if the diagonal move of 1 is the only move. If Black descends at 2, White can't get two eyes in the corner, but now White can poke his head out with 3 and 5. Black can choose between playing 2 in sente or keeping it in reserve and playing a sente move on the outside.

At this point, I'm sure that my readers have a query.




Dia. 13: best for White

Dia. 14: hane first?

Dia. 14. Why doesn't White make the hane at 3 first? Surely it's not logical to keep 3 till later if there's a danger White won't be able to play it. I also had the same thought.

Dia. 15. The instant that White hanes at 3, the placement of 4 will come flying. White won't die, but Black 8 will be absolute sente. Letting Black seal White in so tightly is bad.




Dia. 15: bad for White

Dia. 16: going all-out


Dia. 16. The order of moves shown here is the correct sequence. White 3 makes miai of living in the corner and moving out into the centre. Incidentally, when Black urges White to live with 4, switching elsewhere after 6 may be an effective strategy. If Black 'a', White of course plays a ko with 'b'. If Black has fewer ko threats than White, this all-out strategy may be quite a threat to him. Both sides have to pay attention to the avail-

ability of ko threats.

Dia. 17. Attaching at 1 also looks possible, but actually it doesn't work out very well. Black 4 here doesn't offer strong resistance. White gets a large corner territory with 5, settling his group, and is satisfied.




Dia. 17: bad for Black



Dia. 18: good for Black

Dia. 18. The atari of Black 4 will give White a shock. Playing 5 at 6 is out of the question, so White has no choice but to move out with 5 and 7. Black keeps up the pressure with 8 and 10. Please refer back to *Dia. 3*. If Black exchanges 'a' for White 'b' here, the result is quite similar. Black gains in comparison because he hasn't made this bad exchange.




Reference diagram

White: Mizogami 5-dan; Black: Takanashi 6-dan


Ref. dia. Finally, let's look at another example from a professional game. Mizogami and Takanashi are both up-and-coming young players. In this position both White 1 and Black 2 are natural moves. No matter where Black invaded at the bottom, he wouldn't be able to make an extension next. Moreover, White would get a big corner by playing White 7. Consequently, Black

1 is the only move. Next, let's consider White 2.



Dia. 1: no prospects for White

Dia. 1. If White tries to secure the centre by playing 1, he suffers a large loss when Black eats up the corner profit up to 8. The marked black stone is now seen to be a 'thousand-dollar turning move': it makes the centre area worthless and prevents White from making any territory there. White's formation at the bottom is also wide open. There's nowhere where White can hope to make territory.



Dia. 2: good for Black

Dia. 2. If, however, White defends the corner with 1, Black 2 is a good move: it makes miai of living in the corner and extending to 4. White's bottom formation is still wide open.

White 2 in the reference diagram is therefore just about essential. Black 3 and 5 are necessary; next, White keeps his continuation in reserve and switches to 6. Both these players have clearly done a lot of research.

White 2 is not going to suddenly swing the game in White's favour, but it's a tight move I recommend you to try sometimes. It's a chance to learn how to think more rigorously about go.

(Kido, July 1997. Translated by John Power.)

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